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NOTES
DOING THE NASTY: AN ARGUMENT FOR BRINGING
SAME-SEX EROTIC CONDUCT BACK INTO
THE COURTROOM
If you have a mind that can think about something that is inextrica-
bly connected with something else, without thinking about the
something else, then you have The Legal Mind.
Thomas Reed Powell1
INTRODUCTION
On the morning of August 3, 1982, Officer KR. Torick arrived at
the home of Michael Hardwick with an invalid arrest warrant for fail-
ure to appear in court.2 A house guest answered the door and waved
him into the home.3 Once inside, Torick either observed or heard-
through a partially-open bedroom door-Hardwick and another man
engaged in mutual fellatio. He entered the bedroom and arrested
both men, refusing to leave the room or turn his back while they
dressed. Hardwick's companion, a married schoolteacher from North
Carolina on a weekend search for government employment in At-
lanta, feared the repercussions of his arrest: "Please don't tell my
wife," he begged the arresting officer, "I'll lose my teachingjob."4 Af-
ter handcuffing the men, Torick drove them to the Central Police
Station in Atlanta where he had them photographed, fingerprinted,
and charged with committing the crime of sodomy, defined by a Geor-
1 Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38
UCLA L. Rv. 499, 563 (1991) (quoting a famous but unpublished aphorism attributed to
Powell).
2 For details of the Hardwick arrest, see PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CON-
vIcTIONS: SIXTEEN AMERICANS WHO FOUGHT THEIR WAY TO THE SUPREME COURT 381-403
(1988); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITrrIONAL LAW § 15-21, at 1422-24 (2d ed.
1988); see also Patricia A. Cain, Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L
REv. 1551, 1612 (1993); Mary A. Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment
on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L REV. 1643, 1652-53
(1993); Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the Military: Charting the Constitutional Frontiers
of Status and Conduc 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 381, 431-34 (1994).
8 Cain, supra note 2, at 1612. According to Michael Hardwick, Officer Torick en-
tered the house through an open door and was allowed into the interior by a half-asleep
houseguest on the couch who did not realize that Hardwick and his companion were to-
gether in Hardwick's bedroom. IRONS, supra note 2, at 395.
4 The schoolteacher pled to a lesser charge, Case, supra note 2, at 1653, and decided
that, because of the risk to his job, he could not go on with the case, see IRONS, supra note
2, at 396.
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gia statute as "any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person
and the mouth or anus of another."5 If convicted, they faced from
one to twenty years in prison.6
Hardwick was incarcerated for twelve hours even though he was
legally entitled to bail one hour after his arrival at the station.7 And
Torick made certain that the guards and other inmates knew that he
had been arrested for "cocksucking."8 Upon placing the men in the
holding cell, the officers said, 'Vait until we put [them] into the bull-
pen... fags shouldn't mind-after all, that's why they are here."9
Hardwick challenged Georgia's prohibition on sodomy as an un-
constitutional violation of his right to privacy. In a now infamous
1986 decision, the United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that the Constitution does not protect consensual adult homosexual
sodomy as defined by the Georgia statute.' 0 In so doing, the Court
spawned a new generation of gay-rights litigation that focuses on the
distinction between homosexual status and homosexual conduct. Ac-
cording to Professor Patricia Cain, the Hardwick decision "has
changed the course of gay rights litigation" by making the status/con-
duct distinction the "driving force in shaping new constitutional chal-
lenges to discrimination against gays and lesbians."" This litigation
strategy-dissecting lesbian, gay, and bisexual people into a sexual
and an asexual component-is sculpting the contours of constitu-
tional jurisprudence in regards to sexual orientation.
Part I of this Note discusses the origins of the status/conduct dis-
tinction; Part II describes its evolution; Part III explores its ramifica-
tions; and Part IV concludes that the present effort to divorce status
from conduct, although necessary in the short term, might ultimately
5 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1996).
6 "A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment
for not less than one nor more than 20 years." Id § 16-6-2(b).
7 IRONS, supra note 2, at 396.
8 Id.
9 TRIBE, supra note 2, § 15-21, at 1424-25 n.32.
10 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (5-4 decision). Michael Hardwick de-
scribes the day he learned of the Supreme Court's decision as follows:
A friend of mine had been watching cable news and had seen [a report of
the Court's decision] and knew where to find me and came over. When I
opened the door he was crying and saying that he was sorry, and I didn't
know what the hell he was talking about. Finally I calmed him down and he
told me what had happened: that I had lost by a five-to-four vote.
I was totally stunned. ... Ijust cried-not so much because I had failed
but because to me it was frightening to think that in the year of 1986 our
Supreme Court ... could make a decision that was more suitable to the
mentality of the Spanish Inquisition.
IRONS, supra note 2, at 400. Newsweek magazine printed a poll that said 57% of the popula-
don opposed the decision. Id. at 401.
11 Cain, supra note 2, at 1617.
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harm lesbian, gay, and bisexual people,12 psychologically, socially, le-
gally, and morally.
I
ORIGINS OF THE STATUS/CONDUCT DISTINCTION
Although the Hardwick decision laid the foundation for a depen-
dence on the status/conduct distinction in gay-rights litigation,' 3 two
canons of constitutional law also favor its usage. First, a long-standing
precept of criminal law-that the state cannot punish status unless
accompanied by proof of criminal conduct-makes legal disabilities
placed on persons merely because of their sexual orientation appear
improper even outside the criminal law context. Second, the separa-
tion in First Amendmentjurisprudence between speech and conduct,
such that the former receives protection more readily than the latter,
implies that an admission of homosexuality, by, for instance, a lesbian
12 Although the word "gay" in this Note usually refers to gay men, terms such as "pro-
gay" and "gay rights" are meant to include lesbians and bisexuals. Additionally, I use the
term "homosexual" to refer to lesbians and bisexuals as well as to gay men. Some people
object to the clinical overtones of the word "homosexual," observing that clinicians intro-
duced the term in association with their descriptions of homosexuality as a pathology. See
id at 1626. Furthermore, many lesbians believe that the word "homosexual" conjures up
images of gay men and thus excludes women. MARGARET CRUIRSHANK, THE GAY AND LEs-
BIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT 91 (Roger S. Gottlieb ser. ed., Radical thought/Radical move-
ments 1992). One could also object to including bisexuals under a heading that implies
strict same-sex attractions. Although I agree with these criticisms, I can find no suitable
substitute for the word "homosexual," and so I continue to use it. Some writers prefer the
term "gay," because it lacks the clinical overtones of "homosexual" and because it was "cho-
sen by [gays themselves], as a sign of [their] refusal to be named by, judged by, or con-
trolled by the dominant majority." Id. But "gay," like "homosexual," excludes lesbians and
bisexuals.
The word "queer" may eventually prove superior to any of these alternatives in that it
does not distinguish between lesbian, gay, and bisexual people and even leaves open the
possible inclusion of other groups, like transvestites. I suspect that much of the problem
with terminology in pro-gay literature stems from the fact that the homosexual-heterosex-
ual dichotomy constructed by theorists does not accurately reflect human sexual behavior.
Human sexuality, according to Alfred Kinsey, is a continuum:
The world is not to be divided into sheep and goats.... Only the human
mind invents categories and tries to force facts into separated pigeon-holes.
The living world is a continuum in each and every one of its aspects. The
sooner we learn this concerning human sexual behavior the sooner we shall
reach a sound understanding of the realities of sex.
ALFRED C. KINSEY Er AL., SExuAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 639 (1948).
Additionally, although I identify myself as a bisexual woman, I use the third person
objective when referring to lesbian, gay, and bisexual people as a group. I choose to write
in that voice not in order to distance myself from the gay community, but because I cannot
include myself in many of the struggles that I discuss in this Note. For example, I feel
uncomfortable saying that the military's exclusion of homosexuals deprives "us" of the
opportunity to work for one of America's largest employers. I am deprived of such an
opportunity, of course, but because I have never had any interest in working for the armed
forces, it is difficult to identify myself as having suffered such a deprivation.
13 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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servicemember, would receive greater First Amendment protection
than would any conduct expressive of her sexual orientation. Focus-
ing on her speech and status as distinct from her sexual conduct, con-
sequently, seems wise, especially when the government can
constitutionally criminalize the latter.14 Hardwick comports with these
existing legal canons, and encourages what appears to be a promising
litigation strategy that divides status from conduct.
A. Robinson v. Califomia15
The criminal law permits punishment only after the state or fed-
eral government has proven that a particular defendant has engaged
in proscribed conduct. "Bad thoughts alone cannot constitute a
crime; there must be an act .... Thus the common law crimes are
defined in terms of act.., and statutory crimes are unconstitutional
unless so defined."16
In 1962, the Supreme Court held in Robinson v. Califomia that a
statute criminalizing "addict[ion] to the use of narcotics" violated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.' 7 A police officer had arrested Robinson after examining his
arms and observing "scar tissue and discoloration" on the inside of his
right arm and "what appeared to be numerous needle marks" on the
inside of his left arm.' 8 He testified at trial that Robinson had admit-
ted to the occasional use of narcotics.' 9 Another officer, who had ex-
amined Robinson in the Central Jail in Los Angeles the day after his
arrest, testified that the scabs were several days old and that Robinson
was neither under the influence of narcotics nor suffering withdrawal
symptoms at that time.2 0 Robinson denied that he had ever used or
been addicted to narcotics. 21 He attributed the marks on his arms to
an allergic condition.
In striking down the California law, the Court noted that the stat-
ute punished status without proof of any related antisocial behavior:
This statute... is not one which punishes a person for the use of
narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for anti-social or
14 Assuming, for the moment, that the conduct is, in this instance, same-sex erotic
contact of the type prohibited by the Georgia statute at issue in Hardwick.
15 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
16 WAYNE P. LAFAv & AusN W. SCOTT, JR., CRimiNA. LAW § 3.2, at 195 (2d ed.
1986).
17 The statute read in part "No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be
addicted to the use of narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of
a person licensed by the state to prescribe and administer narcotics." CAL. HEALTH &
SAETY CODE § 11721 (West 1962) (repealed 1972).
18 370 U.S. at 661.
19 1&
20 eL at 661-62.
21 Id. at 662.
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disorderly behavior resulting from their administration.... [W]e
deal with a statute which makes the "status" of narcotic addiction a
criminal offense .... California has said that a person can be con-
tinuously guilty of this offense, whether or not he has ever used or
possessed any narcotics within the State, and whether or not he has
been guilty of any antisocial behavior there.22
But the level of generality at which the Court examined the California
statute muddied the clarity of its rationale. Justice Stewart, writing for
the majority, analogized the situation to one in which a law criminal-
ized mental illness or the contraction of a venereal disease. "[I] n the
light of contemporary human knowledge," he wrote, "a law which
made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be univer-
sally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment ....
[N]arcotic addiction is an illness. Indeed, it is apparently an illness
which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily."23
In emphasizing the specific status targeted by the statute, and in
characterizing that status as a sickness, the Court left the legal commu-
nity unsure of the scope of its holding. Did Robinson stand only for a
prohibition on the creation of a crime of status, or did it reach even
further to prohibit the government from punishing any antisocial act
attributable to a condition over which an individual has no control?
Some commentators interpreted Robinson to mean the latter.24 But
the Supreme Court put that broad reading to rest six years later in
Powell v. Texas2 5 when it held that the state could constitutionally pun-
ish a chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness. Consequently, com-
mentators now understand Robinson to stand for the proposition that
crimes of status and personal condition must require proof of corre-
sponding antisocial behavior in order to satisfy the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.26 This
narrower reading of Robinson means that the government may punish
22 KL at 666.
23 Id at 666-67. He cited various medical authorities for this proposition, pointing
out that addiction may result from the use of medically prescribed narcotics or from the
use of narcotics by one's mother during pregnancy.
24 "[I] t might be argued that the 'illness' rationale of Robinson bars conviction for
that conduct which is an inevitable consequence of the addiction." LAFAvE & Sco-rr, supra
note 16, § 2.14, at 183 (footnote omitted); see also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 568 (1968)
(Fortas,J., dissenting) (arguing that the defendant, a chronic alcoholic, could not prevent
himself from appearing publicly after having become intoxicated).
25 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
26 Courts examining challenges to crimes of status have produced identical results
under substantive due process analyses. See, e.g., LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 16, § 2.12, at
157 nn.73 & 76. "With mere guilty intention, divorced from an overt act or outward mani-
festation thereof, the law does not concern itself." Id § 2.12, at 157 n.73 (quoting People v.
Belcastro, 190 N.E. 301 (Ill. 1934)). The author also cites Proctor v. State, 176 P.771
(Okla. Crim. 1918) ("holding unconstitutional the statutory crime of owning a building
with intent to sell liquor therein"). Id. § 2.12, at 157 n.76.
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status so long as status is accompanied by some proven antisocial con-
duct.2 7 Thus, although the Robinson holding suggests that pro-gay liti-
gators might utilize the status/conduct distinction to their clients'
advantage when no proof of criminal conduct exists, courts can easily
circumvent Robinson by using a person's homosexuality as evidence of
criminal conduct. Any legal disability an individual faces, then, only
incidentally penalizes her for her sexual orientation.28
B. Bowers v. Hardwick
1. Disposition
When the State of Georgia chose not to prosecute him, Michael
Hardwick sued in federal district court for a declaratory judgment on
the constitutionality of Georgia's prohibition on sodomy.29 John and
Mary Doe, a married heterosexual couple, joined in the suit, claiming
that their desire to engage in sodomy had been "chilled and deterred"
by the statute.30 The district court dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.31
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed only the Does' portion
of the complaint, agreeing with the district court that the couple
lacked standing.32 In order to have had standing to facially challenge
the statute, the Does needed to show (1) that they were likely to break
the law and (2) that the authorities were likely to prosecute them for
27 "[I]f this is all that Robinson means, then the scope of that decision is quite limited;
it might be held, for example, that narcotics addiction is still punishable when proof of acts
is required." LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 16, § 2.14, at 182 (footnote omitted). The au-
thors cite at least one court that has so held: State ex reL Blouin v. Walker, 154 So. 2d 368
(La. 1963) (holding narcotics addiction to be punishable when proof of act is also re-
quired), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 988 (1964). LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 16, § 2.14, at 182
n.133.
28 See infra parts I.B.3.a, llI.B.1 for a discussion on the use of status as evidence of
conduct in the military context.
29 Hardwick v. Bowers, No. C83-273A (N.D. Ga. Apr. 15, 1983), reu'd, 760 F.2d 1202
(11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), cited in Cain, supranote 2, at 1612, 1613 n.338.
The American Civil Liberties Union and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund were
planning strategies to challenge the constitutionality of state sodomy laws and approached
Hardwick after his arrest. Hardwick's case seemed promising because he was out to his
family and friends about his sexual orientation and because he worked as a bartender in a
gay bar and so did not have to fear the loss of his employment due to his involvement in
the case. Also, because the officer had actually walked into Hardwick's bedroom, the case
clearly presented a privacy issue; most sodomy charges were issued for public or semi-
public sexual activity. "The behavior for which Michael Hardwick was arrested and tempo-
rarilyjailed took place in his home, a sanctuary to which. . . the fourth amendment ac-
cords special protection." TamE, supra note 2, § 15-21, at 1424-25 (footnotes omitted).
30 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.2 (1986).
31 Id. at 188.
32 The district court found that because the Does "had neither sustained, nor were in
immediate danger of sustaining, any direct injury from the enforcement of the statute,
they did not have proper standing to maintain the action." Id. (citing Hardwick, No. C83-
273A, slip op. at 8).
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their transgression. By claiming only that they wanted to engage in
sodomy and that the statute had deterred them from so doing, the
Does failed to meet the first criterion. Hardwick, on the other hand,
claimed that he regularly engaged in sodomy and that he planned to
do so in the future, thus satisfying the first criterion. The Does failed
to meet the second criterion as well because Georgia police tradition-
ally did not enforce sodomy prohibitions against heterosexuals. Hard-
wick, of course, had actually been arrested and charged with the
commission of a crime and hence easily satisfied the second crite-
rion.33 The Eleventh Circuit therefore reversed the lower court's dis-
missal of Hardwick's claim and ultimately invalidated the Georgia
statute as an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.3 4 Writing for the
majority in language reminiscent of the Supreme Court's privacy deci-
sions, Judge Frank M. Johnson stated that "[f] or some, the sexual ac-
tivity in question here serves the same purpose as the intimacy of
marriage."3 5
The State of Georgia appealed, and, in the words of Professor
Laurence Tribe, who argued Michael Hardwick's case before the
Supreme Court, the question properly before the justices was whether
"private, consensual, adult sexual acts partake of [the] traditionally
revered liberties of intimate association and individual autonomy" rec-
ognized by the Constitution.3 6 The Court, however, narrowed the in-
quiry such that it focused only on sexual intimacy between same-sex
couples and found that the penumbral right to privacy elucidated in
prior case law did not extend to homosexual sodomy.37 Most of the
briefs filed on behalf of Hardwick contended that intimate sexual con-
33 The Court could have limited its ruling on standing to these two factors, but it
instead characterized Hardwick's desire to engage in "the proscribed activity" as more
"genuine" than the Does'. This language, in the words of Professor Nan Hunter, suggests
that "only a homosexual could be genuinely interested in engaging in oral sex" and "con-
flat[es] ... homosexuality with sodomy," or status with conduct. Nan D. Hunter, Life After
Hardwick, 27 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 531, 540-41 (1992).
34 Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204-06 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186
(1986).
35 Id. at 1212.
36 TRIBE, supra note 2, § 15-21, at 1428.
37 The central privacy decisions are: Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (estab-
lishing the right to marry); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (establish-
ing the right to choose which relatives with which to live); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (establishing the right to terminate a pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (extending the right to use contraceptives to unmarried couples); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing the right of married couples to use contracep-
tives); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (establishing the right to procreate);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (establishing the right of parents to direct
the upbringing and education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(establishing the right to teach one's child a foreign language). The issue in Hardwick
should have been controlled by Griswold and Eisenstadt on the theory that a heterosexual
person using birth control has no more connection to procreation than did Michael Hard-
wick and his companion.
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duct between consenting adults was a fundamental right and that the
justices should therefore subject the Georgia law to heightened scru-
tiny.38 The Court, however, rejected this argument, determining that
the Due Process Clause required only a rational basis review of the
challenged statute.3 9 Instead of remanding the case to the court of
appeals, the Supreme Court conducted the rational basis determina-
tion itself, on a partial record and without the benefit of full briefing
on the issue,4° concluding that the statute passed constitutional
muster.41
In conducting its review of the Georgia statute, the Court fol-
lowed a two-step process beginning with the identification of the legit-
imate state interest promoted by Georgia's sodomy prohibition.
42
Next, the Court determined whether the prohibition was rationally
related to that interest.43 In addition to identifying Georgia's interest
as the protection of public morality,44 the Court embarked on a
lengthy historical analysis of the treatment of homosexuality in Eu-
rope and the United States.45 Commentators have roundly criticized
this analysis as "bad scholarship,"46 both for its overreliance on a sin-
gle law review article,47 and for its substantive inaccuracy.48 The ma-
jority claimed correctly, for example, that sodomy "was forbidden by
the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of
Rights,"49 but it failed to acknowledge, or perhaps to even recognize,
that fellatio-the activity for which police arrested Michael Hard-
wick°-0 was not included in the definition of sodomy in 1791. 5 1 Geor-
38 Cain, supra note 2, at 1615 n.351.
39 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191, 196 (1986).
40 Cain, supra note 2, at 1615.
41 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 192-94.
46 Janet E. Halley, ReasoningAbout Sodomy: Act and Identity In and AfterBowers v. Hard-
wick, 79 VA. L. Rwv. 1721, 1752 (1993).
47 The article relied on was: Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional Right
to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. Mami L. REv. 521 (1986).
48 Halley, supra note 46, at 1751-67.
49 Hardwick 478 U.S. at 192.
50 One would never know from reading the opinion exactly what Hardwick and his
companion were doing;, their activity is referred to only as "homosexual conduct," id. at
195, "homosexual sodomy," id. at 190, "that conduct," id. at 192, "such conduct," id. at 190
and "that act," id. at 188. Use of such language creates an image of male-male or female-
female sexual activity as a monolithic, uniform, sameness.
51 See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97YALE LJ. 1073, 1084-85 (1988) ("Courts in at
least seven of the thirty-two statesJustice White found to have 'criminal sodomy statutes in
effect in 1868,' explicitly held that these statutes did not apply to oral-genital contact.")
(footnote omitted) (quoting Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 193 n.6). For a discussion of the inde-
terminacy inherent in our definition of "sodomy," see infra part II.B.1.
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gia did not explicitly ban sodomy until about 1816,52 and even then
state courts diverged sharply on the question of whether that ban ex-
tended to oral sex. In fact, the Georgia Supreme Court did not put
the question to rest until 1904 when it held that the prohibition on
sodomy included that "infamous act... committed... not per anum,
but in even a more disgusting way."53 Against the historical back-
ground presented by the majority, Justice White may have accurately
characterized a claimed "right to engage in [oral sex] . . . 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"' as, "at best, facetious."54
But a different adjective may have applied had the Justices more thor-
oughly researched their history. As for the second step in its rational
basis review, the Court held that Georgia's enactment of a virtually
unenforceable statute regulating private conduct did indeed ration-
ally relate to the protection of public morality.55
2. Tone
The majority's focus on "homosexual sodomy" in the Hardwick
decision is, in the words of Justice Blackmun, "obsessive."56 Justices
White, Burger, and Powell used the terms "homosexual conduct" or
"homosexual sodomy" a total of thirteen times in the space of eleven
pages. Quoting William Blackstone, Justice Burger describes homo-
sexuality as "an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape, a heinous act
'the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature."' 57 The
majority's fascination with the homosexual nature of Hardwick's act is
further evidenced by its analysis of the statute only as applied to ho-
mosexual activity. The statute nowhere mentions the word "homosex-
ual," and briefs for Hardwick argued in terms of a fundamental right
to privacy in intimate associations, not in terms of "a fundamental
right... [for] homosexuals to engage in sodomy."58 By narrowing its
inquiry, the majority could ignore information contained in briefs
prepared by the American Psychological Association and the Ameri-
can Public Health Association indicating that eighty percent of mar-
ried couples practiced oral and/or anal sex; that ninety-five percent of
American men had engaged in oral sex; and that homosexuals were
no more likely than heterosexuals to violate sodomy laws.59 Further-
52 See IRONS, supra note 2, at 383.
53 Halley, supra note 46, at 1763 (footnote omitted) (quoting the court in Herring v.
State, 46 S.E. 876, 881 (Ga. 1904)). For a historical analysis of sodomy laws as they relate to
the Georgia statute at issue in Hardwik, see Halley, supra note 46, at 1750-67.
54 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
55 Id. at 196.
56 Id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
58 I& at 190 (White, J., writing for the majority).
59 IRONS, supra note 2, at 387.
1996] 1143
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
more, in its historical defense of the Georgia statute, the majority en-
gaged in an inquiry that, according to Professor Tribe, was "beside the
point."60 Justice Blackmun echoed this sentiment when, in challeng-
ing the majority's emphasis on pedigree, he quoted Justice Holmes in
saying:
[I] t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
61
The majority's intense and unnecessary focus on "homosexual
sodomy," its refusal to express an opinion as to the constitutionality of
the Georgia statue as applied to heterosexual sodomy, and its myopic
vision of history contradict the veneer of neutrality created by Justice
White's insistence that the decision presented no judgment as to
"whether laws against sodomy between consenting adults in general,
or between homosexuals in particular, are wise or desirable." 62
Rather, the social disapproval of homosexuality that pervades our cul-
ture, to which the justices aptly gave voice, enabled the Hardwick ma-
jority to "cut off constitutional protection 'at the first convenient, if
arbitrary boundary."'63
3. Repercussions
Bowers v. Hardwick forces pro-gay litigators to evade any focus in
the courtroom on their lesbian, gay, and bisexual clients' sexual activ-
ity. It forecloses the application of strict scrutiny in the substantive
due process arena, forces gay-rights advocates to avoid privacy claims
in their challenges to laws that discriminate against homosexuals, and
all but necessitates the use of the status/conduct distinction in equal
protection cases. 64 Justice Blackmun closed his dissenting opinion in
Hardwick with the following words:
60 TRIBE, supra note 2, § 15-21 at 1427.
61 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting O.W. Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HAgv. L. Rrv. 457, 469 (1897)).
62 1d. at 190.
63 TRIBE, supra note 2, § 15-21, at 1422 (quoting from Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
64 If litigators do not distinguish status from conduct, courts might refuse to examine
laws that discriminate against lesbian, gay, and bisexual people with anything more than a
rational basis review, reasoning that homosexuals as a class are defined by conduct that
states can constitutionally criminalize. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65
(7th Cir. 1989) (claiming that the application of strict scrutiny in an equal protection chal-
lenge by a lesbian servicemember would produce an "indefensible inconsistency" in light
of Hardwick), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068,
1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination
against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm."), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Padula
v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("It would be quite anomolous [sic], on its
face, to declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as
[Vol. 81:11351144
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I can only hope that... the Court soon will reconsider its analysis
and conclude that depriving individuals of the right to choose for
themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far
greater threat to the values most deeply rooted in our Nation's his-
tory than tolerance of nonconformity could ever do.65
Ten years later, the convenient boundary at which the Hardwick major-
ity truncated the Constitution's protection of privacy continues to
shape its jurisprudence in the area of sexual orientation.66 And it con-
tinues to threaten this nation's commitment to equality, liberty, and
justice.
C. The Speech/Conduct Dichotomy
Robinson and Hardwick set the stage for the use of the status/con-
duct distinction in gay-rights litigation. But a First Amendment doc-
trine that separates speech from conduct also plays an important role.
This Part, and those that follow, will show that First Amendment juris-
prudence can combine with the status/conduct distinction in such a
way as to make the coming-out speech 67 of lesbian, gay, and bisexual
people vulnerable to government regulation.
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech." 68 Conduct receives no such
protection. Thus the Supreme Court, in a line of cases beginning
deserving of strict [or heightened] scrutiny under the equal protection clause.... [T]here
can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that
defines the class criminal.") (footnotes omitted).
In Romer v. Evans (the most important gay rights case to reach the Supreme Court
since Bowers v. Hardwick), the Court struck down an anti-gay law by applying a biting ra-
tional basis review. 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996); see also infra part II.B.2. (discussing the
law at issue in Romer); infra part III.C.2 (discussing rational basis reviews with "bite"). The
Court's decision may signal the beginning of an era in which lesbian, gay, and bisexual
litigants need not fear this low-level, deferential standard. The Court's holding certainly
represents a strong statement about constitutional limits on government-sanctioned preju-
dice-a welcome edict in the context of a gay rights case, given the Court's previous record
of hostility toward the interests of the queer community.
On the other hand, almost every law survives a rational basis review. See GEOFFREY K
STONE ET AI-, CONsTrrTioNAL LAw 541 (2d ed. 1991); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 16-2, at 1442-
43 (1988). So it does not seem that the lesbian, gay, and bisexual community can confi-
dently view Romer as its safe haven. Pro-gay litigators will probably continue to utilize the
status/conduct distinction, both because of doubts as to the adequacy of rational basis
reviews and because Bowers v. Hardwick remains on the books.
65 478 U.S. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66 And in the area of sexuality in general. See, e.g., Regalado v. Texas, 872 S.W.2d 7
(Tex. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 194 (1994).
67 The phrase "coming out" describes the "complex emotional, psychological, and
sexual experience of naming oneself lesbian or gay." CRUIKSHANK, supra note 12, at 46. It
includes both the process by which lesbian, gay, and bisexual people come to understand
their emotional and physical affinity toward people of the same sex and the act of their
communicating that realization to others. The terms "coming-out speech" and "identity
speech" are used interchangeably in this Note.
68 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt,69 has re-
fused to extend First Amendment protections to certain kinds of con-
duct. But because "[e]xpression and conduct, message and medium,
are ... inextricably tied together in all communicative behavior,"70
distinguishing one from the other often proves problematic. In fact,
according to Professor Tribe, the Supreme Court's attempts to differ-
entiate speech and conduct has led to such "incongruency" that "any
particular course of conduct may be hung almost randomly on the
'speech' peg or the 'conduct' peg as one sees fit."'7 1 In Edwards v.
South Carolina,72 for example, the Court held that 187 demonstrators
were unconstitutionally punished for having paraded peaceably
through the grounds of the State House to protest segregation, calling
their conduct "an exercise of [First Amendment] rights in their most
pristine and classic form." 73 But two years later, in Cox v. Louisiana,74
the Court found, on almost identical facts, that a peaceful demonstra-
tion by 2,000 students was "expression mixed with particular con-
duct,"75 which government could constitutionally regulate. Although
the Court has recognized the value and existence of expressive con-
duct in circumstances ranging from silent political protests to flag des-
ecration, the speech/conduct dichotomy nonetheless persists. 76
69 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (upholding a state law prohibiting labor demonstrations
aimed at creating a union shop). Justice Frankfurter called picketing "speech plus" and
said that states could permissibly regulate the "plus." Id. at 289-90, 292. The Court began
to uphold prohibitions on such demonstrations in a series of cases, the first of which was
decided about seventeen years prior to Teamsters Local 695. See generally TRIBE, supra note 2,
§ 12-7, at 825-32 (discussing the speech/conduct dichotomy).
70 TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-7, at 827 n.12 (quoting Ely, FlagDesecration: A Case Study in
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482,
1493-96 (1975)).
71 Id at 827.
72 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
73 Id. at 235.
74 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
75 Id. at 564.
76 In United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989), for example, the Court recognized the expressive content of flag desecration
unaccompanied by speech. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (displaying the
slogan "Fuck The Draft" on the back of ajacket is expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (reversing a conviction for flag
desecration accompanied by political speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969) (wearing black armbands is expressive conduct protected by the First Amend-
ment); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (holding that silent demonstration on
premises of public library is speech protected by the First Amendment). But see United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning draft cards is conduct not protected by the
First Amendment).
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II
EVOLUTION OF THE STATUS/CONDUCT DISTINCTION
This Part explores the evolution of the status/conduct distinction
from its sporadic appearance in the gay-rights cases that pre-date
Hardwick to its current centrality in pro-gay litigation. It will describe
the way in which First Amendment jurisprudence interacts with the
status/conduct distinction in order to restrict the speech of lesbian,
gay, and bisexual people, especially in challenges to military expul-
sions of homosexual servicemembers. 77
A. Pre-Hardwick Litigation Strategies
Although early legal battles for gay-rights did not invariably distin-
guish status from conduct, they did, at least in the First Amendment
arena,78 set the stage for the status/conduct distinction that currently
pervades gay-rights litigation. In Stoumen v. Reilly,79 for example, the
California Supreme Court distinguished status from conduct and in so
doing created what was probably the first favorable gay-rights ruling in
the United States. In holding that the California Board of Equaliza-
tion could not suspend an owner's liquor license just because his
place of business catered to known homosexuals, the justices wrote:
The fact that the Black Cat was reputed to be a "hangout" for homo-
sexuals indicates merely that it was a meeting place for such per-
sons.... Unlike evidence that an establishment is reputed to be a
house of prostitution, which means a place where prostitution is
practiced and thus necessarily implies the doing of illegal or im-
moral acts on the premises, testimony that a restaurant and bar is
reputed to be a meeting place for a certain class of persons contains
no such implication. Even habitual or regular meetings may be for
purely social and harmless purposes, such as the consumption of
food and drink, and it is to be presumed that a person is innocent
of crime or wrong and that the law has been obeyed.80
The court reiterated this proposition in Vallerga v. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control,8' stating that it would require the govern-
ment to show "something more" than the homosexual status of pa-
trons in order to lawfully deprive a commercial owner of her property
77 See infra parts ll.B.3.a, III.B.I.
78 The gay bar cases used here to exemplify "the First Amendment arena" were not
First Amendment challenges per se, but rather challenges based on procedural due pro-
cess. They certainly touched on the Free Association Clause of the First Amendment,
though, and the courts in these cases focused on the right of homosexuals to associate for
social purposes. Similar treatment appears in the lesbian and gay student organization
cases of the 1970s. See Cain, supra note 2, at 1608-13.
79 284 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1951).
80 Id. at 971.
81 847 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1959).
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interest in a liquor license.8 2 A similar bifurcation of status and con-
duct appears in decisions by courts in every state in which the govern-
ment tried to suspend or revoke the liquor licenses of gay bars.88 By
1967, the highest courts in both New York84 and New Jersey8 5 had
issued rulings that substantially duplicated the California Supreme
Court's holding in Stoumen. Although these decisions meant that the
government could not punish homosexual status itself, they left it free
to punish homosexual conduct either standing alone or in combina-
tion with status, and they endorsed, implicitly and explicitly, an evi-
dentiary sleight-of-hand in which the government used status as
evidence of conduct.8 6
In contrast to the gay bar cases, pre-Hardwick challenges to civil-
ian and military dismissals of homosexual employees did not focus on
the distinction between status and conduct. During the 1950s and
1960s, when many litigators believed that the Constitution protected
private, consensual, adult sexual conduct, homosexual plaintiffs freely
admitted that they engaged in same-sex erotic activity. 7 In emphasiz-
ing the private and consensual nature of this activity, they eventually
persuaded courts to require that civilian employers establish a causal
connection, or "nexus," between homosexual conduct and job per-
formance.88 Thus, private homosexual conduct no longer justified
job terminations in the civilian context.8 9 But the courts' refusal to
extend the nexus requirement to military employers left the armed
services free to discriminate against homosexual servicemembers.
Pre-Hardwick employment discrimination cases, then, in contrast
to the gay bar cases of the same period, did not distinguish status from
conduct. Before 1986, litigators could pick and choose from a variety
of legal strategies. Their volitional use of the status/conduct distinc-
tion in the gay bar cases laid the groundwork for what has become the
major theme in the post-Hardwick world. Bifurcating status and con-
82 Id. at 912. Under the California Constitution, the Department of Alcohol Beverage
Control had to show good cause to deprive a person of a property interest in a liquor
license. Id. at 913.
83 See Cain, supra note 2, at 1571.
84 See Kerma Restaurant Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 233 N.E.2d 833-35 (N.Y. 1967).
85 See One Eleven Wine & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235
A.2d 12, 18 (NJ. 1967).
86 Cain, supra note 2, at 1571-72.
87 Id. at 1599-1600.
88 The "rational nexus test," which applied to all dismissals of government employees
terminated for off-duty immoral conduct, was introduced by the D.C. Circuit in Norton v.
Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Prior to that case, homosexual status served as
evidence of unfitness for the civil service.
89 Congress codified this requirement in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-454, 907, 92 Stat. 1111, 1227. Although secret homosexual conduct might not lead
to job termination, public conduct might: the more public the conduct, the greater the
probability that a court would find an employee's termination justified.
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duct is now practically compulsory; virtually every successful gay-rights
litigation depends on it.
B. Post-Hardwick Litigation Strategies
1. Defining Sodomy
In Hardwick, the Supreme Court placed an official stamp of ap-
proval on criminal sodomy statutes targeted at homosexuals. It thus
set into motion a jurisprudence of sexual orientation that centers on
the concept of sodomy. Sodomy statutes threaten lesbian, gay and bi-
sexual people with surveillance, arrest, indictment, conviction, and
imprisonment. According to attorney Abby Rubenfeld, they "'are the
bedrock of legal discrimination against gay men and lesbians."' 90
Equating homosexuality with sodomy and sodomy with criminal activ-
ity figures at the core of governmental discrimination against homo-
sexuals.91 Police justified their raids on gay bars in the 1950s and
1960s, for example, on the ground that criminal activity might result
from homosexual association.
But the word "sodomy," for most people, "reliably signals little
more than serious wrongdoing."92 It recalls the site of a mass extermi-
nation: the Biblical city of Sodom which, according to Christian theol-
ogy, was destroyed by God after he was unable to find within its
borders a mere ten good men.93 Samuel Pepys might be speaking for
the average American when he writes, in his seventeenth century di-
ary: "I do not.., know what is the meaning of this sin, nor which is
the agent nor which the patient."94 A word historically mired in such
indeterminacy does not, unfortunately, easily rise above its begin-
90 Cain, supra note 2, at 1587 (quoting Lambda Update (Lambda Legal Defense &
Education Fund, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1984, at 3). Rubenfeld directed the Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund from 1983-1988 and was a co-convenor of their sodomy task
force. Id. at 1587 n.209.
91 Outside the military context, Georgia State Attorney General Bowers, for example,
justified his dismissal of a new lawyer in his office on the ground that she had entered into
a marriage ceremony with another woman and thus would, during her tenure with the
Prosecutor's Office, be breaking the laws of Georgia. He said, "the natural consequence of
a marriage is some sort of sexual conduct... and if it's homosexual, it would have to be
sodomy." Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for SummaryJudgment at 32,
Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (No. 1:91-CV-2397- ROF) (quoting
Bowers's dep. at 80-81), vacated, 78 F.3d 499 (1996) (en banc), cited in Cain, supra note 2, at
1637 n.450.
92 Anne B. Goldstein, Reasoning About Homosexuality: A Commentary on Janet Halley's
"Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick," 79 VA. L. Rnv.
1781, 1782 (1993).
93 Genesis 18:32; see JoHN BoswELL, CHRisrIANrry, SociAL TOLERANCE AND HoMosaXu-
ALri' 93 n.2 (1980).
94 Randolph Trumbach, The Birth of the Queen: Sodomy and the Emergence of Gender Equal-
ity in Modern Culture, 1660-1750, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY, RECi.AIMING THE GAY AND LES-
BIAN PAST 129, 131 (Martin Duberman et al. eds., 1989) (quoting from SAMUEL PEPYS, THE
DIARY OF SAMUEL PEPYS 209-10 (Robert Latham & William Matthews eds., 1971)).
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nings. And confusion over the meaning of "sodomy" aggravates the
problems caused by its centrality in the jurisprudence of sexual orien-
tation. According to Professor Janet Halley, "[n] ot knowing what sod-
omy is, not naming it at all, not describing it accurately, [and] not
acknowledging its presence, are all important parts of [the word's] his-
torical profile. Obscurity is part of what sodomy is, a means by which
it attains its social effects."
95
Even official definitions of the word "sodomy" struggle with its
meaning. The American Heritage Dictionay contains a tripartite defini-
tion of the term: "[a]nal copulation of one male with another...
[a]nal or oral copulation with a member of the opposite sex [and] ...
[c]opulation with an animal."96 A survey of criminal statutes from
around the country shows that legal definitions of sodomy also vary
widely. Some states include oral sex in their definition of the pro-
scribed activity, while others do not.97 At least one state even includes
the manual manipulation of genitalia within its definition of
sodomy.98
This indeterminacy allows those who oppose gay rights to equate
homosexuality with a vaguely repulsive act and to simultaneously re-
move heterosexuals entirely from the definition of that act. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, for example, called sod-
omy the "behavior that defines the class" of homosexuals,99 and a
member of the Ninth Circuit described sodomy as "fundamental to
[homosexuals'] very nature."100 The Supreme Court, furthermore, by
entirely eliminating heterosexuals from its Hardwick decision, rein-
forced the notion that homosexuals define, and are defined by, sod-
omy. The corollary to this position, expressed concisely by Senator
95 Halley, supra note 46, at 1757.
96 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1712 (3d ed.
1992). Note that, under this definition, lesbian erotic activity does not constitute sodomy.
State prohibitions on sodomy, on the other hand, often reach sexual activity between wo-
men, and states sometimes enforce sodomy statutes against women. Professor Cain de-
scribes the case of a woman who received a five-year sentence for private, consensual sexual
activity with another woman. Cain, supra note 2, at 1588 n.218.
97 According to Professor Halley, "the volatility of sodomy wheels with particular ra-
pidity around the question whether sodomy includes oral sex." Halley, supra note 46, at
1761.
98 See Goldstein, supra note 92, at 1783-84 nn.10-20 (discussing different sodomy stat-
utes by state). Some sodomy statutes define the prohibited conduct euphemistically, e.g.,
the "infamous crime against nature." I&. at 1784 n.13 (listing Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Virginia).
99 Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v.
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989), ervt. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Woodward
v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990).
100 Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1357 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
1150 [Vol. 81:1135
1996] NOTE-DOING THE NASTY 1151
Strom Thurmond, is that "[h]eterosexuals don't practice sodomy."101
In reality, of course, most heterosexuals do engage in sodomy,10 2 and
some homosexuals do not.' 03 Yet courts seem to view heterosexuals as
incapable of engaging in criminal conduct of this type and homosexu-
als as inevitably engaging in it.104
Post-Hardwick litigators have avoided the indeterminacy inherent
in the definition of sodomy by utilizing the status/conduct distinction
to avoid focusing on any erotic activity in which their lesbian, gay, and
bisexual clients have participated. 0 5 This strategy has resulted in
some success, particularly in the equal protection arena, where two
courts have recently applied strict scrutiny to anti-gay plebiscites that
discriminated against homosexuals. 106 The following Part discusses
one of those cases.
2. Anti-Gay Plebiscites'0 7
In the last two decades, advocates of gay rights have secured the
passage of laws or policies that forbid discrimination on the basis of
101 Senators Loudly Debate Gay Ban, N.Y. TIMEs, May 8, 1993, at A9.
102 See supra text accompanying note 59.
108 "[M]any resolute homosexuals never do any acts that could be called sodomy,
while many resolute heterosexuals are, where sodomy is concerned, avid recidivists." Hal-
ley, supra note 46, at 1722.
104 See, e.g., Halley, supra note 46, at 1734-36; Hunter, supra note 33, at 543.
In the post-Hardwick environment, whatJustice White described as "homo-
sexual sodomy" has become homosexuals as sodomy... Hardwick ... is
construed to authorize state decisionmakers to demote gay men, lesbians,
and bisexuals socially, and to exclude them from certain public debates, on
the grounds that their identity alone gives rise to an irrebuttable presump-
tion that they have committed criminalizable sodomy, and that this inferred
conduct is, in turn, the essential defining feature of their identity.
Halley, supra note 46, at 1734-36 (discussing the indeterminacy of the word "sodomy").
The act of homosexual sodomy "defines the class" of gay men and lesbians,
but the same act of sodomy between opposite sex partners does not "define
the class" of heterosexuals. Heterosexuality discreetly disappears as a cate-
gory of persons defined by sex. Homosexual sodomy, on the other hand,
not only becomes the totality of sodomy, it also becomes the totality of
homosexuality.
Hunter, supra note 33, at 543. In the same article, Hunter discusses the "indeterminacy at
the very core of the concept of sodomy." Id. at 535.
105 The important gay-rights cases in contemporary litigation seem to be those in
which no evidence or admission of homosexual erotic activity exists. See, e.g., infra parts
II.B.3.a and III.B.1 (discussing the military cases).
106 Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996); Equality
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio 1994),
affid in par, vacated in par 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996)
(remanding in light of Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)).
107 The word "plebiscite" refers to an "initiative," in which citizens place a measure on
the ballot "by securing a specified number of signatures," or a "referendum," in which a
measure is ratified or disapproved by the electorate after its adoption by the legislature. See
Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem With Plebiscites, 79 CoRNEt.L L.
Rv. 527, 531 (1994).
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sexual orientation in 119 localities and in at least twenty states, includ-
ing the District of Columbia. 08 During that same period, religious
and political conservatives have fought against extending civil rights
protection to homosexuals.' 09 They have successfully placed plebi-
scites on the ballot in approximately thirty-eight of the communities
that had adopted gay-protective laws." 0 And they have experienced
victory in thirty-four of those communities."' In 1994, voters ap-
proved anti-gay initiatives or referenda in Colorado, Ohio, Maine, and
Oregon. 12
The Hardwick decision, by foreclosing the application of strict
scrutiny in the substantive due process arena, forces advocates of gay
rights to avoid privacy claims in challenges to anti-gay laws and to fo-
cus instead on equal protection. By grounding their arguments
against discriminatory laws on the Equal Protection Clause, pro-gay
litigators hope to carve out a constitutional niche in which courts will
apply strict scrutiny to laws that unfairly burden homosexuals. Ac-
cording to Professor Nan Hunter,
Since Hardwick was decided, the threshold question in the litigation
of lesbian and gay rights cases has become whether Hardwick only
extinguishes the claim to a substantive due process privacy right, or
whether it also predetermines challenges under the Equal Protec-
108 See Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1905,
1923-25 (1993) (tabulating data gathered from NATIONAL GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE POL'Y
INST., LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE U.S. 14 (1993)).
109 Their fight began in 1977 when evangelist singer and former starlet Anita Bryant
successfully led a grassroots campaign to repeal a six-month-old pro-gay ordinance in Dade
County, Florida. Tom Mathews, Battle Over Gay Rights, NEwswzaK, June 6, 1977, at 16.
Although voters defeated anti-gay initiatives in California and Washington in the late
1970s, see THE TIMES OF HARVEY MILK (Cinecom International Films 1986) (discussing the
defeat of Proposition'Six, an anti-gay plebiscite aimed at lesbian and gay schoolteachers in
California); BARRY D. ADAm, THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBtAN MOVEMENT 111, 113 (rev. ed.
1995) (discussing the defeat of a similar initiative in the state of Washington), the political
rise of the religious right beginning in 1980 invigorated anti-gay activists. See id. at 109-27;
Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, supra note 108, at 1908 (the "second
wave of anti-gay-rights activity arrived with the political rise of the New Right in 1980.").
These activists continue to have a strong presence today. Some commentators believe that
religious right organizations have a sophisticated organizational scheme and that they op-
erate under a specific anti-gay agenda. Such organizations do appear to be involved in an
on-going campaign designed to prevent states and municipalities from enacting gay-protec-
tive legislation. See id. at 1909; Lori J. Rankin, Comment, Ballot Initiatives and Gay Rights:
Equal Protection Challenges to the Right's Campaign Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 62 U. CIN. L.
Rxv. 1055, 1055-57 (1994).
110 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. at 427.
II' Id. In 1994, voters approved plebiscites in Colorado; Cincinnati, Ohio; Lewiston,
Maine; Oregon City, Oregon; and Keizer, Oregon. Pamela Coukos, Recent Development
Note, Civil Rights and Special Wrongs-The Amendment 2 Litigation, 29 HARv. C.R1-C.L. L. REV.
581, 581 n.6 (1994).
112 Gerald F. Seib, Despite Clinton's Support, Gay Rights Movement is Facing Backlash Cam-
paigns at the State Leve4 WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1994, at A20.
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don Clause. The courts must still decide whether the decision in
Hardwick was a ruling on conduct or a ruling on a class of people." 3
Several federal courts have held that Hardwick bars heightened
scrutiny, even in the equal protection context. Because states may con-
stitutionally criminalize sodomy, these courts reason that "[i]t would
be quite anomolous [sic], on its face, to declare status defined by
[that] conduct... as deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal pro-
tection clause."" 4 Other courts, and numerous commentators, have,
however, concluded otherwise. According to these sources, courts
may apply strict scrutiny to anti-gay laws challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause without running afoul of the Hardwick mandate be-
cause (1) Hardwick involved only a substantive due process claim; and
(2) Hardwick addressed conduct, not status." 5
The Colorado Supreme Court adopted this reasoning when on
October 11, 1994, it permanently enjoined an amendment to the state
constitution approved almost two years earlier by fifty-three percent of
the voters." 6 Colorado's Amendment Two typified the anti-gay initia-
tives that until recently marred the political landscape. It read:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or de-
partments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipali-
ties or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute,
regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bi-
sexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall consti-
tute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the
Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing." 7
If Amendment Two had become law, lesbian, gay, and bisexual
Coloradans would have had no legal recourse from discrimination in
housing or employment. Furthermore, they could have secured the
passage of gay-protective legislation only by first amending their state
constitution. That would have required either a supermajority of
113 Hunter, supra note 33, at 531-32.
114 Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
115 See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 716-20 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnat, 860 F. Supp. at 439-40;
Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952 (1993); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1371-72 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 909 F.2d 375, 379-80
(9th Cir. 1990) (Canby & Norris,_JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Evans v.
Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996); Janet E. Halley, The
Polities of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L.
REv. 915 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Rela-
tionship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. RE%,. 1161, 1164-68 (1988).
116 Evans, 882 P.2d at 1338.
117 Id
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votes in their state legislature, or an appeal to the same democratic
body that had gutted their rights in the first place.
According to the Colorado Supreme Court, this "fencing-out" of
lesbian, gay, and bisexual citizens violated their fundamental interest
in participation in the political process." 8 The court applied strict
scrutiny to Amendment Two-stating that "[t] he government's ability
to criminalize certain conduct does not justify a corresponding abate-
ment of an independent fundamental right," and found that "[n] one
of the [five] interests identified by the state is a necessary, compelling
governmental interest which Amendment 2 is narrowly tailored to ad-
vance.""19 The status/conduct distinction played a crucial role in the
court's ability to apply strict scrutiny to the proposed amendment.
Without it, Hardwick would have mandated the application of a ra-
tional basis review.
The Supreme Court, however, declined to adopt the reasoning of
Colorado's highest court. Although it affirmed the lower court's judg-
ment, it did so on different grounds. 20 Justice Kennedy did not men-
tion the status/conduct distinction in his majority opinion and the
Court applied a rational basis review, concluding that Amendment
Two "fail[ed], indeed defie[d], even this conventional inquiry."121
Because most laws survive rational basis reviews, 122 this disposition
represents a strong statement about constitutional limits on govern-
ment-sanctioned prejudice.
Such a statement is welcome in the context of a gay rights case,
given the Court's previous record of hostility toward the interests of
the queer community. Moreover, the Court avoided entering the fun-
damental rights quagmire by declining to utilize the Colorado
Supreme Court's rationale. It therefore escaped the inevitable criti-
cism that would have followed such action. 123 In addition, it avoided
fueling the anti-gay argument that lesbian, gay, and bisexual citizens
118 Id at 1350.
119 1& at 1349. The first interest identified by the government was "protecting the
sanctity of religious, familial, and personal privacy." t at 1342. The second interest con-
cerned the conservation of limited government resources. Protecting the rights of lesbian,
gay, and bisexual people, the government argued, would "have an adverse effect on the
ability of state and local governments to combat discrimination against suspect classes." Mrt
at 1345. The third interest was "allowing the people themselves to establish public social
and moral norms." Id. at 1346. The fourth interest was "prevent[ing] government from
supporting the political objectives of a special interest group." Md. at 1348. The fifth inter-
est was "deter[ing] factionalism through ensuring that decisions regarding special protec-
tions for homosexuals and bisexuals are made at the highest level of government." It
120 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 (1996).
121 Id. at 1627.
122 STONE, supra note 64, at 541; TRiBE, supra note 2, § 16-2, at 1442-43 (1988).
123 See Cain, sura note 2, at 1171 (discussing criticisms of fundamental rights
analyses).
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wanted to receive "special" rights via the Amendment Two
litigation. 124
But the Supreme Court did not create a safe haven for the queer
community in Romer, for it failed to even mention Bowers v. Hardwick.
Thus, the status/conduct distinction may still appeal to pro-gay liti-
gators, in both state and federal courts, who doubt that low-level, ra-
tional basis reviews will adequately protect their clients and who fear
the pernicious influence of Bowers v. Hardwick By employing the sta-
tus/conduct distinction, these litigators may experience success in a
post-Romer environment, just as they did prior to the appearance of
that decision. On the other hand, they may discover limitations on
the status/conduct distinction's ability to encourage pro-gay holdings.
The Romer Court, for instance, did not distinguish status from conduct
(perhaps because the justices wanted for political reasons to avoid the
application of heightened scrutiny and were satisfied that a rational
basis review would result in ajust outcome). The striking absence of
the status/conduct distinction from the Romer decision at least argua-
bly calls into question its continued vitality. There are other signs of
its limitations, as well. For example, as the next section demonstrates,
the status/conduct distinction has not advanced the cause of gay
rights in the military context.
3. Military Discharges
[The] riddle [of whether] ... homosexuality [is] status or conduct
... was purely an artifact of... legal doctrine and [of] the outcome
of a single case. Yet it was picked up, replicated and amplified in
the arguments over the military ban.... [The] entire framework
grew out of Hardwick.'2 5
The military's express exclusion of homosexuals creates the back-
drop against which the status/conduct distinction most sharply
emerges. This Part analyzes that exclusion by first describing its his-
tory and mechanics; by next discussing the deference with which such
military decisions are judicially reviewed; and by finally exploring the
impact of the military ban on the civilian community.
124 See, e.g., Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125 Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REv. 1695, 1717 (1993).
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a. The Policy on Homosexuals'26
Prior to World War II, the military routinely punished homosexu-
ality in its ranks by court martial and imprisonment.127 During that
war, however, psychiatric theories defining homosexuality as a mental
disorder convinced military leaders that court martials of homosexual
servicemembers were inappropriate. 128 They instituted regulations
that replaced court martials with administrative proceedings that
culminated in dishonorable discharges. 129 "By the end of World War
II, only those who actually committed homosexual acts were subject"
to those regulations. 30 But in 1958, the military began to dismiss ser-
vicemembers based on sexual orientation.131 For the next twelve
years, military personnel identified as lesbian, gay, or bisexual auto-
matically received dishonorable discharges unless they were diag-
nosed as mentally ill.132
In 1973, homosexual servicemembers began to challenge the
constitutionality of their dismissals in civilian courts.'33 They claimed
that the military should be required to show a nexus between homo-
sexuality and job performance.' 3 4 Their appeals met with little suc-
cess until, in 1981, the D.C. Circuit held in Matlovich v. Secretary of the
126 The military claims that the presence of homosexual servicemembers
adversely affects the ability of the Military Services [i] to maintain
discipline, good order, and morale; [ii] to foster mutual trust and
confidence among servicemembers; [iii] to ensure the integrity of the
system of rank and command; [iv] to facilitate assignment and worldwide
deployment of servicemembers who frequently must live and work under
close conditions affording minimal privacy-, [v] to recruit and retain
members of the Military Services; [vi] to maintain the public acceptability
of military service; and [vii] to prevent breaches of security.
32 C.F.R. § 41, app. A, pt. I(H) (1996). Ironically, the one interest served by excluding
those lesbians, gays, and bisexuals who refuse to remain in the closet is a symbolic, expres-
sive purpose: "To promote an image for the services that accords with the ideology of
masculinity." Karst, supra note 1, at 563. This interest is, however, illegitimate because it is
justified only by prejudice. Id.; cf. infra part II.B.1.
127 ALLAN BfRUBt, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN
WORLD WAR Two 2, 33 (1990).
128 Id. at 2, 13, 33.
129 Id. at 136-37, 143-44.
130 See Jeffrey T. Spoeri, Note, The Pennsylvania Avenue Tug-of-War: The President Versus
Congress over the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military, 45 WASH. UJ. URBAN & CONTEMPORARY
L. 175, 199 (Winter 1994).
131 See id.
132 Gisela Caidwell, Note, The Seventh Circuit in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh: Equating Speech
with Conduct, 24 Loy. LA L. Rxv. 421, 424 n.25 (1991) (citing Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer
Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, Part 1, 11 DAYrON L. REv. 275, 299 (1986)
and BfRUBf, supra note 127, at 202).
133 Id. (citing Rivera, supra note 133, at 288 n.88).
134 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. This phase reached its high point
with the Ben-Shalom litigation. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wisc.), rev'd,
881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
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AirForce35 that the Air Force could not discharge a gay airman unless
it clearly articulated standards for applying a regulation that permit-
ted the retention of homosexual servicemembers under certain un-
specified conditions. Instead of eliminating its exclusionary policy on
lesbian, gay, and bisexual soldiers, however, the Department of De-
fense (DOD) eliminated commanders' authority to make exceptions
to that policy and expressly allowed dismissals based on homosexual
orientation alone.'36 From 1980 to 1990, an average of 1500 ser-
vicemembers were dismissed each year because of their sexual
orientation.137
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), enacted in 1951,
characterizes sodomy as a criminal act punishable by court-martial.' 38
Article 125 of the UCMJ states that "[a]ny person subject to this chap-
ter who engages in unnatural carnal copulation with another person
of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy."139
In promulgating the UCMJ, Congress thus singled out conduct, di-
recting commanders to punish servicemembers who engaged in sod-
omy whether or not they were homosexual. The DOD, however,
explicitly endorsed dismissals based solely on homosexual orientation
in 1981 when it issued the following regulation:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence
in the military environment of persons who engage in homosexual
conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate a propensity to
engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplish-
ment of the military mission.1 40
135 Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
136 See infra note 140 and accompanying text. The DOD changed its policy after
Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and Berg v. Claytor,
591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Courts in both cases required the service to specify stan-
dards for the application of the exception to the general rule requiring the discharge of
lesbian, gay, and bisexual servicemembers.
137 See, e.g., NATIONAL SEC. & INT'L AFFAIRs Drv., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB.
No. 92-98, DEFENSE FORCE MANAGEMENT: DOD's Poucy ON HOMOsExuALrrY 4 (1992)
("During fiscal years 1980 through 1990, approximately 17,000 servicemen and women (an
average of about 1,500 per year) were separated from the services under the category of
'homosexuality.'"); Kurt D. Hermansen, Note, Analyzing the Militaly'sJustifications for its Ex-
clusionary Policy: Fifty Years Without a Rational Basis, 26 Loy. LA. L. Ry,. 151, 152 (citing
KATE DYER, Foreword to GAYS IN UNIFORM: THE PENTAGON'S SECRET REPORTS xiv-xv (Kate
Dyer ed., 1990)).
138 Spoeri, supra note 130, at 198 & n.134.
139 Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1994). "Unnatural
carnal copulation" has been construed to include cunnilingus and fellatio. United States v.
Harris, 8 MJ. 52, 58 (C.MA 1979) (cunnilingus); United States v. Scoby, 5 MJ. 160, 166
(C.MA. 1978) (fellatio). But again note the indeterminacy in the definition: sodomy is
described euphemistically and without reference to the sexual orientation of those in-
volved; the term is nevertheless construed to encompass both homosexual and heterosex-
ual activity, as well as bestiality.
140 32 C.F.R. § 41, app. A, Pt. 1(H) (1) (a) (1996). Each service promulgates regula-
tions designed to implement DOD directives. These directives differ, but each substan-
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The DOD defined a homosexual as one "who engages in, desires to
engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts"' 41 and defined
"homosexual acts" as "bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively
permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satis-
fying sexual desires."'142 Thus a naked desire to engage in same-sex
erotic activity, unaccompanied by any such conduct, constituted
grounds for dismissal under the new regulation. And even if the mili-
tary acquired evidence of proscribed conduct, its regulation did not
require that such conduct resemble sodomy as defined by the statute
at issue in Hardwick. Not only did this regulation penalize status inde-
pendently from conduct, it expanded the definition of homosexual
sodomy to encompass sexual acts that the Constitution may in fact
protect.143
The DOD's current policy, popularly known as "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell, Don't Pursue,"' 44 which became effective on October 1, 1993,
directs the military to refrain from inquiring into the sexual orienta-
tion of servicemembers it recruits and curtails military investigations
into the sexual habits of enlisted servicemembers. 145 Couching itself
in the language of the status/conduct distinction, the policy proclaims
that "[s]exual orientation will not be a bar to service unless mani-
fested by homosexual conduct."' 46 But because the policy then pro-
ceeds to obliterate the line between sexual orientation and same-sex
erotic activity, it eviscerates any protection it might have offered to
homosexual servicemembers. After assuring readers that "[t]he mili-
tary will [continue to] discharge members who engage in homosexual
tially duplicates the DOD directive. SeeKarst, supra note 1, at 549 n.195 (citing T. SARBIN &
K. KAROLs, NONCONFORMING SEXUAL ORIENTATIONS AND MILITARY SurrABILrY 5 (1988) (a
Department of Defense study indicating that the military's exclusion of homosexuals
should be thoroughly reexamined)). The Army, for example, excludes persons "who [are]
admitted homosexual[s] but as to whom there is no evidence that they have engaged in
homosexual acts either before or during military service." Caldwell, supra note 132, at 445
& n.177 (citing A.R. 140-111, thl. 4-2, rule E (1989)). The Army defines a "homosexual" as
.a person, regardless of sex, who engages in or desires to engage in, or intends to engage
in sexual acts with one's own sex." Id. (citingA.R. 135-178 1 10-3(a) (1989), 32 C.F.R. § 41,
app. A, pt. I (H) (1) (b) (1) (1989)).
'41 32 C.F.R. § 41, app. A, pt. 1 (H) (1) (b) (1) (1996).
142 32 C.F.R. § 41, app. A, pt. 1 (H) (1) (b) (3) (1996).
143 Bowers v. Hardwick, after all, only dealt with sodomy as defined by the Georgia stat-
ute. Other types of same-sex erotic conduct may or may not be constitutionally
criminalizable.
144 Goldstein, supra note 92, at 1802 n.108 (citing a New York Times article in which the
new policy is described). The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and the ACLU
have filed suit on behalf of seven individual plaintiffs challenging the new policy and ask-
ing for declaratory and injunctive relief. Doe v. Aspin, No. 93-1549 (D.D.G.July 7, 1993).
145 Memorandum from Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to the Service Secretaries and
the Chairman,Joint Chiefs of Staff, Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces 1-
2 (July 19, 1993) [hereinafter Aspin Memo].
146 Id. app. at 1 (entitled Policy Guidelines on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces)
[hereinafter Policy Guidelines].
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conduct,"147 the new policy goes on to define such conduct to include
"a statement by the servicemember that demonstrates a propensity or
intent to engage in homosexual acts"' 48 and "a statement that the
member is homosexual or bisexual."1 49 Additionally, the policy speci-
fies that "a statement by a servicemember that he or she is homosex-
ual or bisexual creates a rebuttable presumption that the
servicemember is engaging in homosexual acts or has a propensity or
intent to do so.150 This evidentiary sleight-of-hand allows the military
to bypass the Robinson prohibition on penalizing pure status. 151 In
addition, the DOD avoids running afoul of the First Amendment by
simply hanging coming-out speech on the "conduct peg,"152 trans-
forming the act of speaking of the words "I am gay" into "conduct"
and utilizing the speech/conduct distinction as a sub rosa tool for le-
gitimating the military's discriminatory policy.' 53
Furthermore, the new DOD policy expands the definition of "ho-
mosexual conduct" to include "any bodily contact which a reasonable
person would understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts"'I54 as well as a "marriage or attempted
marriage to someone of the same gender."155 This definition of "ho-
mosexual conduct," in addition to implicating First Amendment pro-
tection of religious expression, encompasses sexual acts that the
government probably cannot constitutionally criminalize, such as
hand holding and kissing.156 But even if the government could crimi-
nally punish the conduct described above, no other military regula-
tions penalize the sheer desire to engage in illegal acts, whether
expressed or unexpressed, that occur either "preservice, prior [to]
service, or [during] current service." 157 Only homosexuality and
same-sex erotic conduct receive such treatment.
Since 1981, then, the DOD has converted the congressional pro-
hibition on sodomy contained in the UCMJ-written to apply equally
to homosexual and heterosexual behavior-into a policy that singles
147 Policy Guidelines, supra note 146, at 1.
148 Aspin Memo, supra note 145, at 2.
149 Policy Guidelines, supra note 146, at 1.
150 Aspin Memo, supra note 145, at 2.
151 See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
152 See supra text accompanying note 71.
153 See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-7, at 826 n.7 (discussing the manipulation of the
speech/conduct distinction by courts).
154 Aspin Memo, supra note 145, at 2. This language is in additi6n to the language
regarding same-sex bodily contact engaged in to satisfy sexual desires. See supra text ac-
companying note 142.
155 Policy Guidelines, supra note 146, at 1.
156 High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1371-
72 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd in part, vacated in par4 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
157 See 32 C.F.R. § 41, app. A, Pt. 1 (H) (1) (c) (1996); Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216 P,
slip op. at 39 (D. Me. April 3, 1984), vacated and remanded, 755 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1985).
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out homosexuals. The current regulations primarily penalize status;
in fact, "homosexual conduct" does not necessarily lead to expulsion
from the service because the military's anti-gay policy still contains an
exception designed to prevent the intentional avoidance of military
service by heterosexuals. 158 A commander does not have to dismiss a
servicemember who has engaged in homosexual sodomy if that ser-
vicemember is heterosexual.
b. Judicial Deference
No clearly articulated standard determines the scope of judicial
deference to the political branches with respect to military decisions.
But in a 1953 Supreme Court decision, upholding an Army require-
ment that a military physician declare whether or not he belonged to
any "subversive" organizations, Justice Robert Jackson called the mili-
tary a "specialized community" and indicated that constitutional pro-
tection must yield somewhat to its peculiar needs.159 Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, one of Justice Jackson's clerks that year, has
begun to resurrect that language. In advocating judicial deference to
military authority, the Chief Justice has described the armed services
as a "separate community."160 "When the Court is confronted with
158 Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Under the
Army's regulations, 'homosexuality,' not sexual conduct, is clearly the operative trait for
disqualification.") (Norris, J., concurring), cert. denied 498 U.S. 957 (1990). Some com-
mentators suggest that the exception allows the military to retain soldiers in times of need,
e.g., during the Iraq war dismissals based on homosexuality were suspended. See, e.g., Karst,
supra note 1, at 579. "Homosexual conduct" will not result in discharge if the military finds
that
1) Such conduct is a departure from the soldier's usual and customary be-
havior; and
2) Such conduct is unlikely to recur because it is shown, for example, that
the act occurred because of immaturity, intoxication, coercion, or a desire
to avoid military service; and
3) Such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimi-
dation by the soldier during a period of military service; and
4) Under the particular circumstances of the case, the soldier's continued
presence in the Army is consistent with the interest of the Army in proper
discipline, good order, and morale; and
5) The soldier does not desire to engage in or intend to engage in homo-
sexual acts.
Watkins, 875 F.2d at 713 n.5 (Norris, J., concurring) (quoting A.R. 635-200, 15-3(a) (1)-
(5)).
159 Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
160 According to Professor Karst, there are three main justifications for this deference:
(1) emergencies; (2) respect for the special needs of a "separate community," and (3) "the
judiciary's relative incompetence to understand military matters." Karst, supra note 1, at
568. With regard to the first justification, "we need to be careful to keep the claim of
emergency temporally confined, to reject the argument that because Armageddon may
come out of the blue, some constitutional guarantees should be indefinitely suspended."
Id With regard to the second justification, the attenuation of constitutional rights in the
military setting does not mean that generals should interpret the Constitution. Id at 569-
74. In challenging the third justification Professor Karst asks: What makes generals ex-
[Vol. 81:115
NOTE-DOING THE NASTY
questions relating to military discipline and military operations," the
Chief Justice has written, "[it] properly defer[s] to the judgment of
those who must lead our Armed Forces in battle."' 61 Thus the DOD's
current policy will presumably benefit from the same level ofjudicial
deference as that traditionally afforded military decisions. The judici-
ary has already turned a blind eye to the military's evasion of Robin-
son's prohibition on crimes of status. 162 And it has already allowed the
military to manipulate the speech/conduct distinction in order to
punish coming-out speech. 16 3
c. Effects of the Military Ban
The failure of pro-gay arguments centering on the status/con-
duct distinction to undermine the military's exclusion of lesbian, gay,
and bisexual servicemembers will have an effect on civilian litigation.
Even though the judiciary defers substantially to the political branches
in the military context, holdings and rationales from cases challenging
the military ban will probably creep into cases involving the larger
community, far removed from the peculiar needs of the armed serv-
ices. Thus, the status/conduct distinction may fail advocates of gay
rights even outside of the military. In short, the exclusion of homo-
sexual servicemembers may provide a prototype for discrimination
elsewhere.
Official sanctions of prejudice can escape their military confines
and influence the larger community in even more subtle ways. In
1953, for example, President Dwight D. Eisenhower revived a World
War II policy that excluded lesbian and gay Americans from the
perts on homosexuality? He points out that they have been indoctrinated in a culture that
disparages and excludes lesbian, gay, and bisexual people and that their expertise lies in
the area of military science, not in the areas of social science, psychology, or constitutional
law. I& at 575-81.
161 North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 443 (1990). But, according to Profes-
sor Karst, judicial deference to the judgment of those more familiar with military matters
"comes close to creating a 'military exception' to the Bill of Rights." Karst, supra note 1, at
565. It "turns out to be deference to a political policy to maintain the traditional gender
line, and the systems of dominance expressed by that line: men over women, straights over
gays." Id. at 579. According to Professor Karstjudges should not defer to regulations that
deeply offend the Constitution. Id. at 572. As Justice Brennan observed, "it is equally true
that judges, not military officers, possess the competence and authority to interpret and
apply the First Amendment." Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The majority held that military officials could bar a soldier from circulating a
petition on a military base without prior approval if the material posed a "clear danger to
military loyalty, discipline, or morale." Id. at 355.
162 Although the current military regulations do not impose criminal sanctions on
homosexuals, and thus avoid an outright Robinson bar, they stigmatize and penalize les-
bian, gay, and bisexual people by depriving them of employment and by burdening their
prospects of future employment (they lose the preferential treatment for veterans to which
they would otherwise be entitled).
163 See infra part mH.B.1.
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armed services, extending it to the entire federal civil service.'6 Pro-
fessor Kenneth Karst observes that
It is no exaggeration to say that the exclusion of gay men and lesbi-
ans from the armed forces, having brought the idea of homosexual
identity to the American public's attention and having served as a
model for other severe restrictions on persons identified as homo-
sexuals, has been the single most important governmental action in
maintaining public attitudes that stigmatize homosexual
orientation. 165
Because personnel flow continuously into and out of the armed
forces, with veterans taking their training and experience back into
the civilian world, the military's institutionalization of anti-gay preju-
dice stigmatizes lesbian, gay, and bisexual people in civilian life. Even
absent that continuous flow of personnel, the military's exclusion of
homosexual servicemembers would probably be well-known to the
public, given the fact that the military is a highly visible arm of the
government. The military's discriminatory policy thus provides a
model on which to base anti-gay laws, as it simultaneously legitimizes
and reinforces public prejudice against lesbian, gay, and bisexual
people.
The government's argument to the contrary-that the discharge
of an openly gay servicemember implies no stigma even when a disclo-
sure of the ground for discharge accompanies his dismissal-is uncon-
vincing. Nonetheless, courts have accepted that claim. In Doe v.
Casey,166 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that
an openly gay CIA employee did not, by definition, regard his homo-
sexuality as stigmatizing. But, as Professor Karst points out, the court
"ignored a factor that was glaringly obvious-the more generalized
stigmatizing of all gay Americans implicit in the government's making
homosexuality a ground for exclusion." 167 Just because a gay individ-
ual acknowledges his homosexuality without shame does not mean
that society at large treats his sexual orientation with respect, and
when the military characterizes lesbian, gay, and bisexual people as
unfit for military service, it encourages the opposite treatment. Sup-
pose, for example, that the military explicitly dismissed a Muslim sol-
dier on the ground that she practiced Islam. If this soldier had always
considered herself Muslim, and had been open about her religion,
164 Karst, supra note 1, at 567 n.254 (citing BtRUBt, supra note 127, at 265-70 (1990)).
This ban was ended in the mid-1970s. Id. (citing T. SARBIN & K. KA.RoLs, NONCONFORMING
SEXUAL ORIENTATIONS AND MiLIARY SurrABILriY 5 (1988).
165 Karst, supra note 1, at 558-59 (footnotes omitted).
166 796 F.2d 1508, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aJJd in par. reuld in part sub nom., Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
167 Karst, supra note 1, at 559.
1162 [Vol. 81:1135
1996] NOTE-DOING THE NASTY 1163
would courts consequently find that the military's dismissal implied
no stigma?168
The government's exclusion of homosexuals from the armed
forces severely penalizes lesbian, gay, and bisexual people. In addi-
tion to depriving them of the opportunity to work for one of the larg-
est employers in the country, it further restricts their personal liberty
by providing a prototype for discrimination in the civilian community.
The status/conduct distinction has failed, so far, to protect homosex-
ual servicemembers from such discrimination. Courts have upheld
the military ban even though it primarily penalizes status, and even
though it implicates important First Amendment rights. 169 Although
pro-gay litigators used a variety of legal strategies prior to the Supreme
Court's Hardwick decision, 170 they have, since Hardwick, felt compelled
to employ the status/conduct distinction as their central tool in chal-
lenging anti-gay laws. This strategy has, however, met with limited suc-
cess. Although it has convinced two courts that an application of
heightened scrutiny in the equal protection context does not under-
mine the Hardwick holding,171 the previous subsection demonstrates
that it has not similarly advanced the cause of gay rights in the military
context. Moreover, because the failure in the military context may
spill over into the civilian community, pro-gay litigators should face
the weaknesses inherent in the status/conduct distinction and explore
alternative litigation strategies. 172
168 I base this hypothetical on one by Professor Karst See Karst, supra note 1, at 559.
169 See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 1996 WL
396112 (Oct. 21, 1996).
170 See supra part IIA
171 See supra part I.B.2 (discussing Evans v. Romer and Equality Found. of Greater Cincin-
natz Inc. v. City of Cincinnati).
172 The recent Romer v. Evans decision also argues for a re-evaluation of the status/
conduct distinction. In Romer, the Court invalidated an anti-gay initiative to Colorado's
constitution by applying a mere rational basis review. Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627, 1629
(1996). It found that the challenged law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution. Id. at 1629. Because the Court utilized a rational basis review,
it did not need to avoid the holding of Bowers v. Hardwick, which forbids the application of
strict or heightened scrutiny to anti-gay laws challenged on substantive due process
grounds, like privacy. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); supra part I.B.3. It did
not, in other words, need to employ the status/conduct distinction in order tojustify the
use of a level of scrutiny higher than rational basis.
In fact, the majority nowhere mentioned the status/conduct distinction. Its analysis
therefore left open the central question in gay rights litigation: does Hardwick foreclose
the application of strict or intermediate scrutiny in the equal protection arena, as it does in
the substantive due process arena? Does the status/conduct distinction provide courts
with a legitimate argument by which to circumvent the Hardwick holding in cases grounded
on equal protection claims?
The conspicuous absence of the status/conduct distinction is open to at least three
interpretations. First, the majority's failure to distinguish status from conduct may signal
its disapproval of the status/conduct distinction. After all, the distinction was available to
the Court: the Colorado Supreme Court utilized it, Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350
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III
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE STATUS/CONDUCT DISTINCTION
This Part analyzes two possible weaknesses in a legal strategy cen-
tered on the status/conduct distinction. It discusses the advantages of
the status/conduct distinction, and then proceeds to examine its po-
tentially negative effects on both the legal and social discourses sur-
rounding sexual orientation. It concludes that the status/conduct
distinction may ultimately fail to protect the rights of lesbian, gay, and
bisexual people, and suggests some alternative litigation strategies.
A. Defenses of the Distinction
Two important benefits derive from a legal strategy that separates
status from conduct. First, the status/conduct distinction makes clear
that homosexual conduct-exemplified by sodomy, for most courts-
does not define homosexual orientation. Lesbians, for example, re-
tain a sexual attraction toward women regardless of whether or not
they have sexual relationships with women. 173 In fact, sexual orienta-
tion remains static even when an actor chooses celibacy. " [T]he real-
ity for many gay men and lesbians is that sexual identity (status) is
something much broader than sexual conduct, and in some cases...
may even exclude sexual conduct." 74 Thus, by recognizing a distinc-
(Colo. 1994), and briefs filed on behalf of the respondents argued in its terms. Brief of the
Human Rights Campaign Fund et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 28-30,
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996); Brief for Respondents at 46 n.32, Romer v. Evans,
116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). Second, the majority's failure to distinguish status from conduct
may indicate that the Court is not willing to apply anything more than a rational basis
review to anti-gay laws, even in the equal protection context. On the other hand, the third
interpretation of the majority's failure to distinguish status from conduct is that the Court
did not want to use heightened scrutiny in this particular equal protection case. Thejus-
tices may share, or at least understand, the antipathy some sectors of the legal community
feel for the fundamental rights doctrine and thus may have wanted to avoid that doctrine.
Or they may themselves feel animosity toward the queer community, or doubt that commu-
nity's claim of disadvantage, and as a result may have wanted to avoid bestowing suspect
class status upon homosexuals. Or they may simply have evidenced, in Romer, a prudent
desire to avoid fueling the flames of an anti-gay argument based on the notion of "special"
rights. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24 (discussing the Romer decision and the
"special rights" argument).
173 Many homosexuals identify themselves as homosexuals without ever having en-
gaged in sexual conduct with a person of the same sex. Cain, supra note 2, at 1625 n.395;
see also GaryJ. McDonald, Individual Differences in the Coming Out Process for Gay Men: Implica-
tions for Theoretical Models, 8 J. HoMosExuArriy 47 (1982) (citing an article and study in
which approximately 18% of 199 men who identified themselves as gay said that they had
not had any sexual experiences with men).
174 Cain, supra note 2, at 1625. One study of 199 gay men showed that 18% identified
themselves as gay before they had ever experienced a sexual act with a man. Ten percent
recognized that they were gay at the time of their first homosexual encounter, 22% identi-
fied themselves as gay while involved in a long-term homosexual relationship and twenty-
three percent so defined themselves only after such a relationship had ended. McDonald,
supra note 173, at 52-53.
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tion between status and conduct, courts avoid a definition of homo-
sexuality based solely on erotic activity, and thereby acknowledge the
fullness and complexity of lesbian, gay and bisexual lives. Removing
homosexuality from a purely sexual context serves additionally to un-
dermine the stereotype that lesbian, gay, and bisexual people are dan-
gerously promiscuous sexual predators. 75
Second, the status/conduct distinction refutes the idea that les-
bian, gay, and bisexual people invariably engage in sodomy. 76 When
judges view status as having an existence independent of conduct,
they can no longer use homosexuality as reliable evidence of certain
behaviors. They cannot, for instance, assume thatjust because a plain-
tiff is gay, he engages in the type of constitutionally unprotected sex-
ual activity at issue in Bowers v. Hardwick.177
The status/conduct distinction thus allows judges to maneuver
around the Hardwick holding, by restricting it to fact patterns involv-
ing sodomy as defined by the Georgia statute, and to call into question
judicial decisions that refuse protections to homosexuals because they
belong to a class defined by criminal conduct. By demonstrating that
lesbian, gay, and bisexual people lead full and complex lives that in-
175 According to one Florida minister, gay men want pro-gay laws passed so that they
can "walk down the streetsj [ack] ing off." Mike Thomas, Are Gay Rights A Civil Right? David
Caton Says No, and He Wants Florida Voters to Close the Debate Forever, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July
18, 1993, at 8, 10 (quoting Rev. James Sykes). The ReverendJerry Falwell contends that
"[s] o-called gay folks [would] just as soon kill you as look at you." Mathews, supra note 109,
at 16, 22. One anti-gay video claims that homosexuals are "disproportionately homicidal"
and have killed a majority of mass murder victims in the last two decades. Brian T.
Meehan, Scholars Cast Doubt on Accuracy of Anti Gay Video, OREGONIAN, Oct. 8, 1992, at Al.
During a 1977 campaign to repeal a Florida pro-gay ordinance, Anita Bryant claimed that
homosexuals were committed to "recruitment and outright seductions and molestation" of
minors. Mathews, supra note 109, at 20. An anti-gay Christian group in Oregon distributed
fliers claiming that "'[pledophilia may be publicly denounced by many homosexuals but it
is definitely represented as a "sexual orientation" under the gay rights umbrella.'" Brian T.
Meehan & Bill Graves, OCA Stirs Emotions With Its Second Flier, OREGONIAN, Sept. 25, 1992, at
DI, D4. Colorado for Family Values, an anti-gay Christian group, dispersed a pamphlet
claiming that "gays commit up to half of all child molestations;" that "twenty-nine percent
of lesbians intentionally spread sexual disease;" and that "of mass murders in the U.S. over
the past seventeen years, homosexuals killed at least sixty-eight percent of the victims."
Colin Crawford, Gay Rights Wins in Oregon and Portland, Maine; Losses in Colorado and Tampa,
Forida, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES, Dec. 1992, at 83. Actually, 90% of reported sexual molesta-
tions of children are committed by heterosexual men on minor females. Betty Berzon,
Developing a Positive Gay and Lesbian Identity, in PosrVnt.y GAY 3, 9 (Betty Berzon ed., 1992)
(citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH EDUC. & WELFARE, NAT'L CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT,
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECI. THE PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT, PUB. No. (OHD) 75-
30073).
176 This function is, however, limited by the fact that the status/conduct distinction, by
attdmpting to minimize the focus on gay sexuality, avoids a direct confrontation of the
indeterminacy inherent in the definition of sodomy.
177 To give due consideration to the rights of homosexuals,judges must recognize this
fact and restrict Hardwick to its facts. For example, a gay plaintiff and his partner might,
instead of engaging in sodomy, practice mutual masturbation.
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volve much more than sexual activity, and by refuting the idea that
homosexuals invariably engage in sodomy, the status/conduct distinc-
tion adds an important and valuable element to the judicial under-
standing of sexual orientation.
B. Criticisms of the Distinction
Notwithstanding those benefits, however, a gay-rights jurispru-
dence that depends for its vigor on an excision of erotic conduct from
sexual orientation may have harmful long-term effects. As long as
post-Hardwick litigators feel compelled to remove a crucial element
from gay identity-specifically, the love, intimacy, and affection that
lesbian, gay, and bisexual people share with their same-sex partners-
they reinforce rather than challenge the Hardwick holding, making
homosexuals, for the time being, something less than whole people.
Furthermore, the use of the status/conduct distinction might en-
courage anti-gay forces to develop laws and policies that repress ho-
mosexuality more than ever before.
1. Effects on the Legal Discourse: Equating Speech with Conduct
In the military context, where the status/conduct distinction is
most tenacious, it has failed to undermine the military's exclusionary
policy toward homosexuals. Defenders of the policy have simply ex-
panded the definition of "conduct" to include speech and other ex-
pressive behavior. In Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,178 for example, the Seventh
Circuit upheld an army regulation that required the dismissal of any
178 Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir.), revg Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 703 F.
Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990). Miriam Ben-Shalom "was
the first self-identified homosexual litigant to challenge the military's policy of excluding"
lesbian, gay, and bisexual people solely on the basis of their sexual orientation. Caldwell,
supra note 132, at 429. In 1974, she enlisted in the Army Reserves. 703 F. Supp. at 1373.
Two years later, after she had disclosed her lesbianism, the Army discharged her. Id. She
sued in the district court for wrongful discharge, claiming that the Army had violated her
free speech, privacy, and substantive due process rights. Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of Army,
489 F.Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980). The privacy claim derived from the Ninth Amendment
and related to autonomous control over personality; the First Amendment clalm related to
the protection of manifestations of personality. The district court ruled in Ben-Shalom's
favor and ordered the Army to reinstate her. Id. Nevertheless, the Army refused to rein-
state Ben-Shalom and thus precipitated a procedural battle that ended when the Federal
Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the case and transferred the litigation to
the Seventh Circuit. Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 807 F.2d 982, 988 (Fed. Cir.
1986). The Seventh Circuit ultimately ruled in Ben-Shalom's favor. Ben-Shalom v. Secre-
tary of the Army, 826 F.2d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 1987). So, in 1987, the Army belatedly com-
plied with the district court's 1980 order to reinstate Ben-Shalom. Eleven years had passed
since her discharge. But when her enlistment period expired only eleven months later and
Ben-Shalom requested reenlistment, the Army refused and a second round of litigation
began. Ben-Shalom won this second litigation at the district court level, but lost on appeal
to the Seventh Circuit. 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1380-81 (E.D. Wis. 1989), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454,
466 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
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"individual who is an admitted homosexual but as to whom there is no
evidence that they have engaged in homosexual acts either before or
during military service."1 79 In so doing, the court dangerously ex-
panded the concept of conduct. It characterized Ben-Shalom's identi-
fication of herself as a lesbian as an "admission" of culpability: 80
What Ben-Shalom cannot do, and remain in the Army, is to declare
herself to be a homosexual. Although that is, in some sense speech,
it is also an act of identification. And it is the identity that makes
her ineligible for military service, not the speaking of it aloud.
Thus, if the Army's regulation affects speech, it does so only inci-
dentally, in the course of pursuing other legitimate goals. "When
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms."' 8 '
The court did not assert that speech indicates status and that status
provides evidence of conduct. It skipped the intermediate step, argu-
ing that Ben-Shalom's speech itself constituted conduct. 8 2 This con-
flation of speech and conduct would seem absurd if it were not for the
alarming fact that it came from a federal court of appeals in a case
that upheld the Army's dismissal of a lesbian servicemember without
any evidence of homosexual erotic conduct. It recalls the ancient
English concept of constructive treason in which a defendant's speech
provided evidence of his treasonous act of imagining the sovereign's
death.' 8 3 A similar concept, existing under the early common law in
the United States and codified in the Sedition Act of 1798,184 was re-
pudiated when, in 1804, PresidentJefferson pardoned those punished
under the Act, and Congress repaid the fines collected under it.185
179 AR. 140-111, thl. 4-2, Rule E, quoted in Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 457 n.3.
180 The Seventh Circuit applied the United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968),
conduct test, treating Ben-Shalom's speech like conduct. OBrien provides that
when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regu-
lating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms.... [A] governmental regulation is sufficientlyjusti-
fled if... it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 376-77.
181 Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 462 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376), cert. denied 494 U.S.
1004 (1990).
182 Id. Alternatively, the court seems to equate Ben-Shalom's coming-out speech with
"identity," or status, and it characterizes the military's penalization of pure status as "legiti-
mate." Id. But see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), discussed supra part IA.
183 See L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 122-23 (1985).
184 The Sedition Act, 1 Stat. 596, ch. 74 (1798) (expired by its terms in 1801).
185 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (discussing the Sedition
Act).
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Although the Supreme Court never ruled on the constitutionality of
the Sedition Act, it did comment that there existed "a broad consen-
sus that the Act... was inconsistent with the First Amendment."186 In
Ben-Shalom, the Seventh Circuit adopted an analysis that denies First
Amendment protection to pure speech. Even though the court em-
ployed this analysis in the military context and therefore deferred con-
siderably to military judgment, it still endorsed a dangerous and
potentially unconstitutional restriction on expressive freedom, a re-
striction that may well have repercussions in the civilian
community.1 87
A judiciary that can boldly assert that pure speech is the same
thing as conduct should have little trouble extending that treatment
to symbolic speech. By wrongly characterizing expressive manifesta-
tions of personality or belief as conduct, courts can ignore the protec-
tion guaranteed by the First Amendment to thoughts, emotions, and
personality. 188 In Pruitt v. Cheney,l8 9 for example, the Ninth Circuit
expressed an impoverished view of the scope of First Amendment pro-
tection for expressive conduct and religious freedom when it upheld
an Army regulation mandating the discharge of any soldier who "en-
ters into a homosexual marriage ceremony."190 The court accepted
the government's argument that Captain Dusty Pruitt had, by com-
pleting a marriage ceremony with another woman, admitted (1) to
having previously participated in lesbian erotic activities and (2) to
having a continuing desire to participate in such activities in the fu-
186 Id.
187 One might argue that the patent absurdity of calling speech "conduct" will under-
mine judicial acceptance of the status/conduct distinction. This may be true: an absurd
legal argument is more vulnerable to attack than a solid one. But how long will the doc-
trine last before an attack is successful? The patently absurd doctrine announced in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), survived for some 60 years before being supplanted.
188 The First Amendment protects manifestations of personality as a penumbral right.
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (emotion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 565-66 (1969) (thoughts).
189 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1020 (1992). Dusty Pruitt
served actively in the Army for over four years, attaining the title of Captain. Id. at 1161.
The Army would have promoted her to Major, but two weeks before her promotion be-
came official, a reporter for the Los Angeles Times interviewed Pruitt about her lesbianism,
her position as minister of a lesbian and gay church, the fact that she had participated in
marriage ceremonies with two women, and the problems she encountered as a lesbian in
the armed forces. Id. The Army withdrew her promotion after The Times published the
article. Id.
190 Karst, supra note 1, at 549. This section focuses on Army regulations that single out
expressive conduct in the form of marriage. The Pndtt litigation did not revolve only
around Pruitt's marriages (she freely admitted her lesbianism to the military after publica-
tion of the Los Angeles Times article); the outcome of the litigation would have likely been
the same whether or not the military had any evidence of "homosexual conduct" beyond
those ceremonies.
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ture.19' The symbolic expression contained in a religious ceremony,
in other words, constituted prohibited conduct. 192
In manipulating the speech/conduct dichotomy in order to pro-
duce an outcome favorable to the military, the Ninth Circuit abdi-
cated its responsibility to protect First Amendment rights from
unnecessary restrictions. Moreover, the court turned its back on a
constitutional principle that has been described by a Wisconsin fed-
eral district court as follows: "One's personality develops and is made
manifest by speech [and] expression.... It is only when one's person-
ality, no matter how bizarre or potentially dangerous, actually
manifests itself in the form of unlawful conduct, that the government
may intercede in an effort to control the personality or restrict its
manifestation." 93 Hardwick does not direct courts to abandon their
responsibility to protect the Constitution; contrary to what one may
gather from the Ninth Circuit's holding in Pruitt, there exists neither
a military nor a homosexual exception to the Bill of Rights.
In Ben-Shalom and Pruitt, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, respec-
tively, refused to protect expression that some commentators and at
least one court have viewed as political speech implicating core First
Amendment principles. 194 Professor Karst, for example, believes that
[w]hen Reverend Pruitt was Captain Pruitt, her straight Army col-
leagues and superiors knew her as an outstanding officer. Now that
she has made her gay identity public, those people are challenged
to reconsider their understanding of what it is to be homosexual-
to reshape their abstract and threatening idea of "a homosexual" in
a way that will make room for this real person whom they know and
respect. The likelihood of such a reconsideration, I suggest, is ex-
actly what the political leadership of the Defense Department fears
in cases like this one. 195
191 Pruit, 963 F.2d at 1163. Pruitt actually participated in two marriage ceremonies;
however, her participation in a single ceremony would'have sufficed.
192 The military is creating a new generation of legal fictions that equate speech and
other expressive behavior with conduct.
193 Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 976 (E.D. Wis. 1980); cf. supra
part IA
194 See, e.g., Karst, supra note 1, at 561; Hunter, supra note 125, at 1703 ("[T]o come
out is to implicitly, or often explicitly, affirm the value of homosexuality."). Homosexuality
is not merely status or conduct; it is an idea that threatens the status quo. Prohibitions on
identity speech also implicate the right not to speak. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977) (holding that a state statute forcing people to display messages to which they were
ideologically opposed on their private property invaded their First Amendment rights).
Staying silent about one's sexual orientation implies, by default, that one is heterosexual.
Prohibiting identity speech thus compels a message about oneself to which one might be
ideologically opposed.
195 Karst, supra note 1, at 562.
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The California Supreme Court has likewise described coming-out
speech as an "aspect of the struggle for equal rights,"196 finding that
statements of homosexual identity constitute political speech pro-
tected by that state's labor code. 197 To openly identify oneself as a
lesbian contradicts prevailing social mores by affirming the value of
homosexuality in a cultural climate that constantly denigrates it. The
judiciary, by silencing that affirmation, allows the government to "pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, [and]
other matters of opinion"'98 and thus loses sight of one of the "fixed
stars in our constitutional constellation."'199 Identity speech is not
only "in some sense speech," as the Seventh Circuit claimed in Ben
Shalom, 20 0 it is speech itself. The court cannot cover the emperor's
nakedness by simply admiring his new clothes.
The status/conduct distinction has failed to protect lesbian, gay,
and bisexual identity, and may have even encouraged a line of deci-
sions (including Ben-Shalom and Pruitt) that seriously threaten gay
rights. Not only have courts continued to accept the proposition that
status implies conduct, they have broadened the definition of conduct
to include behaviors that the First Amendment seems to clearly pro-
tect.20 1 The argument that status exists entirely separately from con-
duct has apparently forced judges, to whom the status/conduct
distinction may appear disingenuous, to nevertheless couch their deci-
sions in terms of that distinction.20 2 These judges have expanded the
concept of "conduct" to the point where they allow the government to
jeopardize core First Amendment principles. But one can understand
their disdain for the status/conduct distinction if one forgets, momen-
tarily, about the Supreme Court's Hardwick holding. The love, inti-
macy, and affection that lesbian, gay, and bisexual people share with
their same-sex partners is indeed a crucial element in sexual orienta-
tion, and insofar as the status/conduct distinction denies that reality,
196 Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610 (Cal. 1979).
197 Id. at 610-11. It is thus rather ironic that the Pruitt decision came out of the Ninth
Circuit.
198 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
199 Id.
200 Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004
(1994).
201 The courts have manipulated the speech/conduct dichotomy to deny constitu-
tional protection to lesbian, gay, and bisexual people. The fact that this conflation of
speech and conduct is constitutionally unsound does not mean that a pro-gay litigation
strategy grounded in the distinction between status and conduct is solid.
202 [I]f homosexual status is accorded constitutional protection by the courts,
there is every reason to believe that government actors will become more
intent onjustifying their discriminatory actions in terms of conduct rather
than status. We are seeing such a move now as the new military policy
broadly defines prohibited conduct to include acts of self-identification.
Cain, supra note 2, at 1627.
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it pollutes the theoretical discourse on homosexuality. It may also
cripple the development of civil rights doctrines that would benefit
lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.
2. Effects on Social Discourse
a. Throwing the Baby Out With the Bathwater
According to Professor Hunter,
Self-identifying speech does not merely reflect or communicate
one's identity; it is a major factor in constructing identity. Identity
cannot exist without it. That is even more true when the distin-
guishing group characteristics are not visible, as is typically true of
sexual orientation. Therefore, in the field of lesbian and gay civil
rights, much more so than for most other equality claims, expres-
sion is a component of the very identity itself. This is a paradox that
current law cannot resolve. 203
If the status/conduct distinction successfully protected identity
speech, it might make sense for lesbian, gay, and bisexual people to
accept it as a temporary and pragmatic, albeit unsavory, legal strategy.
But, as the previous section demonstrates, it fails to do so. And yet it
continues to drive the contemporary dialogue. Advocates of gay rights
seem to have forgotten that the status/conduct distinction owes its
vitality to one adverse Supreme Court holding and that the distinction
is, after all, only a legal construct.20 4 Real people are whole people.
We do not have a sexual component that is completely distinct from
an otherwise asexual self.
Commentators forget that fact when they claim (as Professor
Marc Fajer did) that Miriam Ben-Shalom's acknowledgment of her
lesbianism "[was] certainly not compelling evidence she [would] en-
gage in [same-sex erotic activity] while under the jurisdiction of the
army, unless you believe that, as a lesbian, she is simply incapable of
self-control." 20 5 Granted, Ben-Shalom might have abstained from sex-
ual relations with the woman to whom she had ceremonially declared
her commitment while under the military's jurisdiction. But in real-
ity, she probably would not have remained celibate. She would have
instead done what thousands of homosexual servicemembers have
203 Hunter, supra note 125, at 1718. Justice Brennan has also noted that "it is realisti-
cally impossible to separate [a lesbian's] spoken statements from her status." Rowland v.
Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1016 n.11 (1985) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (up-
holding the dismissal of a public school teacher who confidentially identified herself as
bisexual to a colleague).
204 Romeris silent on the status/conduct distinction, leaving the vitality of this litigation
strategy an open question.
205 Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereo-
types, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MtAM L. REv. 511, 545-50 (1992)
(arguing that discrimination against lesbians and gay men is a form of sex discrimination).
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done throughout the history of the armed forces' anti-gay policy; she
would have made love with her partner privately, hidden from the
military view. Georgia State Attorney General Bowers's contention
that, to most people, "the natural consequence of a marriage is some
sort of sexual conduct" rings true.2 06 And declaring oneself a lesbian,
barring a religious oath of celibacy, does seem to imply that one will
engage in sexual activity with women; at the very least it implies a de-
sire to engage in such activity. To claim otherwise is intellectually and
emotionally dishonest.
That dishonesty has already taken a toll on the gay community.
The status/conduct distinction seems to have convinced some people
that homosexual erotic conduct is literally, as opposed to legally, dis-
tinct from homosexual orientation. Pro-gay litigators call upon psy-
chologists to testify that "sexual orientation is distinct from, and exists
wholly independently of, sexual behavior or conduct,"20 7 and con-
vince courts to find that "a distinction between homosexual orienta-
tion and homosexual conduct is well grounded in fact."20 8 In so
doing, they betray the celebration of sexuality for which the gay rights
movement once stood, and they reinforce a tradition of secrecy that
deprives lesbian, gay, and bisexual people of deserved dignity.20 9 Se-
crecy about homosexuality sends the message to the heterosexual ma-
jority that lesbian, gay, and bisexual people are ashamed of their
sexual orientation, and it erodes the self-esteem of individual mem-
bers of the gay community.210
206 As much as I hate to, I must agree with Bowers on this point.
207 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,
426 (S.D. Ohio 1994), affid in part, vacated in par 54 F.Sd 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (paraphras-
ing wimess's testimony), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding the case in light of
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)). From this, the court made the following finding
of fact: "Sexual orientation is a characteristic which exists separately and independently
from sexual conduct or behavior." Id.
208 Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 919 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
209 Lesbian, gay, and bisexual people have historically hidden their sexual orientation
from heterosexuals. The status/conduct distinction continues that tradition, and in so
doing, affronts the dignity of queer people. It might also encourage the tradition of clan-
destine sexual activity in the gay male community, a tradition that might have encouraged
the spread of AIDS.
210 When lesbian, gay, and bisexual people remain closeted about their sexual orienta-
tion, they sustain significant emotional and psychological harm. Immersion in a culture
that constantly denigrates homosexuality causes them to internalize homophobia, just as
women and people of color sometimes internalize sexism and racism. The closet rein-
forces this self-hatred and prevents queer people from forming positive images of
themselves.
[The closet exacts a high price in self-esteem, emotional health, and access
to the community. It is not only the constant stress of maintaining a wall of
secrecy around life's most intimate associations that makes the closet so
onerous, but also the way in which it can powerfully sustain the kind of
"internalized homophobia" that makes difficult the "emergence of positive
identity in a context of external oppression."
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The status/conduct distinction also opens the door for anti-gay
arguments that focus on homosexual erotic activity as volitional and
therefore amenable to change. One pro-gay court found, for exam-
ple, that "sexual conduct may be a matter of volition, [but that] sexual
orientation is not," and that sexual orientation "is a characteristic...
beyond the control of the individual... [and] existing independently
of any conduct that the individual... may choose to engage in. 211
The court's argument powerfully advocates the status/conduct dis-
tinction, but by describing sexual orientation as unamenable to
change and same-sex erotic conduct as volitional, the court unwit-
tingly invites arguments that homosexuals can choose heterosexual
lifestyles. Minimizing the importance of erotic activity to sexual orien-
tation provides an opportunity for anti-gay activists to claim that les-
bian, gay, and bisexual people can rise above their weaknesses and, in
the words of one Christian leader, fight their inclination toward "un-
natural sex behavior. 212
The status/conduct distinction endangers the health and well-be-
ing of individual members of the gay community by dismissing as in-
significant the erotic relationships that they share with one another,
by abdicating the celebration of sexuality for which the gay-rights
movement originally stood, by feeding the tradition of secrecy that
surrounds homosexuality, and by providing a foundation upon which
anti-gay activists can attack same-sex erotic conduct. In escaping Hard-
wick, pro-gay litigators have symbolically neutered their constituency,
convincing sympathetic courts that the status/conduct distinction ac-
curately reflects reality.21 3 But by divorcing status from conduct, they
may be throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 21 4 If the Supreme
Court had held in Powell v. Texas that the government could not con-
Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents,
29 HAmv. C.R.-C.L L. REv. 283, 299 (1994) (footnotes omitted). Consequently, when
queers come out, they experience the psychological and emotional well-being necessary to
develop a positive self-esteem. See, e.g., Evan Wolfson, Note, Civil Rights, Human Rights, Gay
Rights: Minorities and the Humanity of the Differen4 14 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 32 n.46
(1991).
211 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 417, 437 (S.D. Ohio
1994), aff'd in part, vacated in part 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519
(1995) (remanding case in light of Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)).
212 "'We're all born with weaknesses. I may have to fight being lazy, others have to
fight drug addiction, others are born with a weakness toward unnatural sex behavior. They
should fight it.'" Debbi Howlett, Movement Against Gays to be Tested at Polls, U.S.A. TODAY,
Oct. 29, 1992, at 5A (quoting Lon Mabon, the Oregon Christian Association's Director,
during Oregon's anti-gay Measure 9 propaganda drive).
213 One court, for instance, found a study indicating that "'homosexuals [have] actu-
ally demonstrated a lower level of sexual interest than [have] heterosexuals'" useful in
coming to its pro-gay decision. Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy, 830 F. Supp.
1319, 1332 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (quoting PERSEREC report).
214 "[T]here is a certain degree of absurdity to making legal arguments in favor of gay
and lesbian rights that ignore sex.... The conduct/status distinction contributes to this
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stitutionally punish achronic alcoholic for behavior attributable to his
condition, 215 would pro-gay litigators have argued in Hardwick that the
Constitution prohibited states from punishing homosexual sodomy
because it resulted from the disease of homosexuality?
b. Reinforcing Heterosexism
Hardwick ushered in the present period in gay-rights litigation in
which the status/conduct distinction figures at the center of the dia-
logue on sexual orientation. But deferring to Hardwick in this way
allows an obscure definition of sodomy to exist unchallenged, and by
extension allows the heterosexual majority to remain ignorant of the
actual content of same-sex erotic conduct. Present litigation strategies
respond to stereotypes of homosexuals as oversexed sodomites216 by
dismissing same-sex erotic conduct as insignificant to homosexual
identity. This tactic, in turn, chills speech about sexuality within the
gay community itself. For example, a professor of political science,
who recently appeared as a witness in a challenge to an anti-gay initia-
tive, testified that "those who organized the 'March on Washington'
did not represent the mainstream homosexual population."217 He ap-
parently feared that including leather boys and drag queens within
the larger gay community would focus unwanted attention on same-
sex erotic conduct.218 But removing a minority population from the
larger gay community merely caters to heterosexual predilections and
allows the straight community to control homosexual behavior. A liti-
gation strategy that encourages lesbian, gay, and bisexual people to
disown portions of their own community transforms its constituency
into an agent of its own oppression.21 9
absurdity by pretending that status can be successfully bifurcated from conduct." Cain,
supra note 2, at 1641.
215 See supra part IAL
216 See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
217 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,
425 (S.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd in part, vacated in part; 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (paraphras-
ing the wimess's testimony), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding in light of Romer
v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)).
218 The participants in the March on Washington represented the mainstream homo-
sexual population-drag queens and all. Although most of the participants were not
leather boys or drag queens, these minority populations are certainly a part of the larger
gay community.
219 Additionally, in chilling speech about same-sex erotic activity both within and
outside of the gay community, the status/conduct distinction does nothing to counter the
lack of information in the straight community about what it is, exactly, that lesbian, gay,
and bisexual people do in bed. It thus allows ignorance about the scope and content of
sodomy prohibitions to continue unchallenged. It also fails to challenge misunderstand-
ings about heterosexuality. Part of the difficulty in the military cases is that they make
obvious the fact that sexuality is a continuum and that the categories "homosexual," "heter-
osexual," and "bisexual" are limiting.
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The current gay-rights litigation strategy negatively affects the so-
cial discourse on homosexuality by dismissing the significance of
same-sex erotic conduct to lesbian, gay, and bisexual identity and by
allowing the straight community to continue to equate same-sex erotic
conduct with sodomy, thereby reinforcing heterosexist stereotypes of
homosexuals.
C. Suggested Alternatives
In order to circumvent the status/conduct distinction's weak-
nesses, pro-gay litigators should restrict its reach by emphasizing its
legal, as opposed to its literal, veracity; by using it to bifurcate sodomy
from homosexual status; and by demonstrating its relationship to the
speech/conduct dichotomy of First Amendment jurisprudence. At
the same time, they should seek out alternative strategies for asserting
gay rights, four of which appear below.
1. Restricting the Reach of the Status/Conduct Distinction
In order to restrict the reach of the status/conduct distinction,
advocates of gay rights must recognize that it represents, in terms of
sexual orientation, a legal, and not a literal, truth, and they must com-
municate this fact to others. Just because a corporation is a "person"
for equal protection purposes, for example, does not mean that it
comports with the dictionary definition of a "person" as "[a] living
human being."220 Distinguishing same-sex erotic conduct from ho-
mosexual identity may be useful for certain legal purposes, but overre-
liance on that distinction distorts the reality of many lesbian, gay, and
bisexual lives. In addition, reliance on the status/conduct distinction
may fuel arguments by anti-gay activists that same-sex erotic activity is
volitional and that homosexuals can refrain from such behavior. Also,
if the status/conduct distinction appears disingenuous, it may gener-
ate a negative response from the judiciary and from the public. 22 1
Furthermore, pro-gay litigators should narrow the status/conduct
distinction to focus on the conduct at issue in Hardwick instead of ex-
tricating all erotic conduct from homosexual status. Pro-gay litigators
should use Robinson to confront, rather than to avoid, the indetermi-
nacy inherent in the word "sodomy." And they should continue to
insist that the government refrain from punishing actors based solely
on their predispositions. Moreover, they should undercut presump-
220 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DicrIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1351 (3d ed.
1992).
221 By appearing to be a clever but dishonest legal argument, the status/conduct dis-
tinction may, in fact, fuel the argument that lesbian, gay, and bisexual people are asking
for "special rights." If, however, pro-gay litigators make it clear that the status/conduct
distinction is a legitimate, albeit abstracted, legal concept, perhaps at least legal actors will
understand that there is no disingenuity in making the argument.
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tions of conduct that emanate from the mere fact of status 222 "by argu-
ing that the step from valid criminalization of actual conduct ... to
valid discrimination on the basis of presumed conduct is a big one."223
In so doing, pro-gay litigators can challenge the idea thht homosexu-
als define and are defined by the act of sodomy, and they can thus
acknowledge the fullness and complexity of lesbian, gay, and bisexual
lives.
Finally, pro-gay litigators should, in the process of restricting
their use of the status/conduct distinction, utilize the speech/conduct
dichotomy to directly attack restrictions on free speech. They should
not, for example, characterize the military as having penalized status
in a case like Ben-Shalom; rather, they should characterize it as having
penalized political speech.
2. Four Alternative Methodologies2 24
Pro-gay litigators, should, in their attempts to create legal strate-
gies that avoid the weaknesses of the status/conduct distinction, first
try to more accurately represent their clients' lives. Lesbian, gay, and
bisexual litigants should speak explicitly about the role of sex in their
lives in order to more accurately demonstrate its contribution to self-
identity and to dispel the myth that all homosexuals engage in
sodomy.225
Second, pro-gay litigators should attempt to limit Hardwick strictly
to its facts. The Supreme Court held in that case only that the right to
privacy does not extend to homosexual sodomy as defined by the
Georgia statute at issue in the case. Other types of erotic conduct
between homosexuals may or may not merit constitutional protection.
DistrictJudge Thelton Henderson recognized this fact when, in ruling
in favor of the plaintiffs in a substantive due process gay-rights case, he
wrote:
The Supreme Court in Hardwick simply did not address the issue of
all homosexual activity.... Hardwick does not hold, for example,
that two gay people have no right to touch each other in a way that
expresses their affection and love for each other. Nor does Hard-
222 Several of the lesbian and gay bar and student association cases discuss the impro-
priety in presuming conduct from status. For a discussion of these cases, see generally
Cain, supra note 2, at 1608-11.
223 Id. at 1626-27.
224 Much of this discussion is taken from Pat Cain's very useful survey of lesbian and
gay legal history. See id. passim.
225 Of course, many lesbian, gay, and bisexual people do engage in sodomy, depend-
ing on how one defines that term. But not all homosexuals engage in any given activity
that might be called "sodomy." Lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, like heterosexual peo-
pIe, vary their sexual practices such that, although two people might sometimes engage in
sodomy, they might engage in other types of erotic activity as well. These distinctions are
important in light of Hardwick
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wick address such issues as whether lesbians and gay men have a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual activity such as kissing,
holding hands, caressing, or any number of other sexual acts that
do not constitute sodomy under the Georgia statute.226
Decisions like the one in State v. Walsh,227 in contrast, should not
occur. In that case, a Missouri court used Hardwick to uphold the in-
formation2 28 of a man who had touched the penis of another, fully-
clothed man with his hand.2 2 9 Judge Blackmar pointed out in his dis-
sent that the majority had egregiously broadened the Hardwick
holding:
I am... inclined to believe that [the Missouri statute] goes beyond
the limits of state power in defining "deviate sexual intercourse" as
involving the hand. This is not the offense of sodomy as discussed in
... Bowers v. Hardwick, and it has no long history of legal sanction
such as seemed very important to Justice White in that case. Bowers
recognizes a right of privacy under the Constitution of the United
States, but holds that this right of privacy does not extend of of-
fenses traditionally punished as sodomy. Its rationale is absent
here.23 0
Pro-gay litigators can further undermine Hardwick's rationale by
presenting detailed historical analyses of homosexuality in cases that
involve proscribed conduct. They can use the results of historical
studies that show, for example, that in the late eighteenth century,
English people viewed lesbian relationships as positive so long as they
did not interfere with heterosexual marriage.23' Furthermore, in ad-
dition to limiting Hardwick to the specific conduct prohibited by the
Georgia statute, pro-gay litigators should limit it to the substantive due
process arena. They should continue to argue, for instance, that Hard-
wick does not foreclose the application of strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause.232
226 High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1370
(N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd in part, vacated in par 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
227 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
228 An "information" is an accusation against an individual for allegedly committing a
criminal offense. It differs from an indictment only in that it is presented upon the oath of
a public official rather than on the oath of a grandjury. BLAcK's LAw DicTIoNAaY 779 (6th
ed. 1990).
229 Walsh, 713 S.W.2d at 509, 511. The Missouri statute criminalized sexual contact
involving the hand of one person and the sexual organ of another. Id. at 509 (quoting the
Missouri statute as condemning any "sexual act involving the genitals of one person and
the mouth, tongue, hand or anus of another person").
230 Id. at 514 (Blackmar, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
231 See Cain, supra note 2, at 1632-33 nn.424-26.
232 According to Professor Cain, "Hardwick... leaves litigators free to make substantive
due process claims regarding other forms of conduct, both sexual and nonsexual." Id. at
1631. Romer v. Evans leaves open the question of whether courts can apply strict scrutiny to
anti-gay laws in the future. See supra note 172.
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Third, pro-gay litigators seeking to avoid the pitfalls of the status/
conduct distinction should insist that courts hearing civilian gay-rights
cases strictly limit the holdings of cases involving the military to their
facts. They should remind judges that those decisions represent a def-
erence to the political branches of government and an appreciation of
the peculiar needs of the armed forces. In this way, litigators can cur-
tail the effects on the civilian community of decisions adverse to the
rights of lesbian, gay, and bisexual servicemembers. They can attack
the following three themes that appear in the military cases as inap-
propriate to the civilian context: (1) severe restrictions on speech and
symbolic expression; (2) evidentiary presumptions of illegal conduct
when no real evidence of such conduct exists; and (3) broad defini-
tions of constitutionally unprotected sexual conduct.
Finally, pro-gay litigators should not dismiss the utility of a ra-
tional basis review. In Romer v. Evans, for example, the Supreme
Court handed down a decision favorable to the queer community
without applying heightened scrutiny.233 In so doing, it used what
might be called a rational basis review with "bite."234 This type of ra-
tional basis review gives rise to an invalidation of a challenged law for
any of three reasons. A court might strike down a law in this manner
by characterizing the government's purported interest as "illegiti-
mate," 235 by finding irrational the means chosen to achieve an admit-
tedly legitimate state interest, 236 or by finding that a given law has as
its foundation an improper purpose.237 In Romer, the Court most fully
embraced the last of these concepts. It cited United States Dep't of Agri-
culture v. Moreno2 38 and observed that Amendment Two "raise[d] the
inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed [was] born of ani-
mosity toward the class of persons affected." 239
In a post-Romer environment, attacks on the reasonableness of
anti-gay laws might hold more promise than they did prior to that
decision. Pro-gay litigators should therefore continue to argue against
233 Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996).
234 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. REv. 1, 20-24
(1972).
235 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
236 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
237 Matthew Coles, Equal Protection and the Anti-Civil-Rights Initiatives: Protecting the Abil-
ity of Lesbians and Gay Men to Bargain in the Pluralist Bazaar, 55 OHIo ST. L.J. 563, 566 (1994).
238 413 U.S. 528 (1973). In Moreno, the Court struck down a portion of the Food
Stamp Act of 1964 designed to "exclude[ ] from participation in the food stamp program
any household containing an individual who is unrelated to any other member of the
household." Id, at 529; accord City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450
(1985). In Moreno, the Court found improper the possible desire on the part of Congress
to exclude "hippie communes" from the federal food stamp program. Moreno, 413 U.S. at
543.
239 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
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the rationality of laws that unfairly burden lesbian, gay, and bisexual
people. For instance, when a court sits in a state that does not
criminalize homosexual sodomy, "pro-gay litigators should "argue that
[discrimination] against lesbians and gay men can hardly be justified
on grounds of public morality."24° Or, when a case concerns employ-
ment discrimination, pro-gay litigators should continue to ask courts
to require the government to show a nexus between homosexuality
and job performance. They should demand that the government sup-
port its justifications for discrimination with factual material. This
strategy worked in California when a district court there refused to
accept the argument that the military ban is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose.241 The DOD's own studies, intro-
duced into evidence in the case, concluded that "no empirical proof
exists . . '[to support the Navy's contention that] homosexuality has
an adverse effect upon the completion of the [military] mission."' 242
This type of analysis is useful outside the employment context as well:
courts need not uphold discriminatory policies when the govern-
ment'sjustifications for those policies are devoid of factual support.2 43
CONCLUSION
The status/conduct distinction has failed to protect the rights of
lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.24 4 Although some lower courts
have used the distinction to bypass the Supreme Court's Hardwick
holding and to apply strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause,245 the status/conduct distinction has not, in the military con-
text, advanced the rights of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people. In re-
240 Cain, supra note 2, at 1629.
241 Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455, 1457-58 (C.D. Cal.
1993), affid in part, vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1469 (1994).
242 Goldstein, supra note 92, at 1803-04 n.114 (quoting the Chief of Naval Personnel).
243 The military's justifications for its discriminatory policy are, for example, contra-
dicted by its own internal documents. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 92, at 1803 n.114;
Karst, supra note 1, at 548 n.194.
244 "To date, the status/conduct distinction has met with minimal success in the
courts." Cain, supra note 2, at 1627.
245 See, e.g., Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996); Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437
(S.D. Ohio 1994), affid in part, vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S.
Ct. 2519 (1996) (remanding in light of Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)). Although the
Supreme Court's Romer decision forecloses the application of strict or intermediate scru-
tiny in cases challenging anti-gay initiatives like the ones struck down in Evans and Equality
Foundation (because the Romer Court used a rational basis review), pro-gay litigators may yet
find uses for the status/conduct distinction. Laws discriminating against lesbian, gay and
bisexual people will probably continue to appear, and they are sure to differ from Colo-
rado's Amendment Two and Cincinnati's Issue Three. Because the Supreme Court
neither condemned nor approved the status/conduct in Romer, litigators may continue to
separate status from conduct in order to enable courts to bypass the Hardwick holding and
apply heightened scrutiny to anti-gay laws that differ from those at issue in Evans and Equal-
ity Foundation.
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viewing the military's ban on homosexual servicemembers, courts
have simply recast status in terms of conduct, and they have thus re-
fused to extend constitutional protection to expression that would
have otherwise clearly implicated the First Amendment.
Moreover, the status/conduct distinction lacks long-term utility
because it reinforces, rather than challenges, a holding that gay-rights
litigators would like to see reversed. According to Professor Cain,
"[llitigation strategies for the advancement of lesbian and gay rights
should be planned with an eye to the eventual reversal of Hard-
wick."246 But litigators have used the status/conduct distinction to
avoid, rather than to confront Hardwick, and in so doing, they have
encouraged the tradition of secrecy surrounding homosexuality in
our culture; they have facilitated heterosexual ignorance about homo-
sexual identity and behavior; and they have presented an inaccurate
picture of lesbian, gay, and bisexual lives by dismissing as insignificant
the love and affection that same-sex couples share.
In order to avoid these weaknesses, advocates of gay rights should
abandon the status/conduct distinction as the central tool in pro-gay
litigation and, like litigators in the pre-Hardwick period, should utilize
a variety of legal strategies, including those that focus attention on
same-sex erotic conduct. Although Hardwick to a large degree necessi-
tates the use of the status/conduct distinction, it leaves room for sev-
eral alternative strategies for asserting gay rights: litigators should (1)
more accurately represent their clients' lives by allowing them to talk
about the role of sex in their identity; (2) explore the possibility that
erotic conduct between homosexuals that differs from that proscribed
by the Georgia sodomy statute may merit constitutional protection;
(3) insist that courts hearing civilian gay-rights cases strictly limit the
holdings of military cases to their facts; and (4) demand that courts
overturn laws that are not rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment purpose. In addition, advocates of gay rights should, when us-
ing the status/conduct distinction, restrict its reach as much as
possible by (1) emphasizing, to courts and to the public, that the sta-
tus/conduct distinction represents a legal, as opposed to a literal,
truth; (2) concentrating on distinguishing sodomy, rather than all
erotic conduct, from homosexual status; and (3) directly challenging
restrictions on First Amendment rights via the speech/conduct di-
chotomy instead of through an attenuation of the status/conduct
distinction.
Teresa M. Bruce
246 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
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